

“On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of
Liberating Insight and Enlightenment in Early Buddhism”
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ON SOME ASPECTS OF DESCRIPTIONS OR THEORIES OF 'LIBERATING
INSIGHT' AND 'ENLIGHTENMENT' IN EARLY BUDDHISM*

A.

1.

The present paper¹ is an attempt at developing some issues of my paper "Zur Struktur der erlösenden Erfahrung im indischen Buddhismus"^{1a}, to which the reader is referred, although I could not avoid repeating myself to a certain extent for the sake of convenience.

The topic to be discussed is Liberating Insight (or Experience) and Enlightenment as described in the canonical texts of Early Buddhism, especially in the Sūtrapīṭaka. For practical reasons I use the term 'Enlightenment' with exclusive reference to the (historical) Buddha, and the term 'Liberating Insight' either with special reference to his Disciples (*śrāvaka*), or in a comprehensive sense including both Enlightenment and the Liberating Insight of the Disciples. The texts themselves, it is true, do not always use the corresponding terms (viz. [*saṃ*] *bodhi* on the one hand, and *ājñā/aññā*, etc., on the other) in such an exclusive way².

The present paper is not concerned with all aspects of Liberating Insight and Enlightenment³, but focusses particularly on the question of their content.

1 The present paper was submitted to a symposium on Buddhology held in London on the 8th and 9th of November, 1979, and ought to have been sent in for publication to the organizers of the symposium. At that time, however, conscious of the provisional and incomplete character of the paper, I withheld it in order to revise it thoroughly after the completion of two other more urgent projects. Unfortunately, it has become apparent in the meantime that there will be no chance for such a revision in the near future. Therefore, I have decided to confine myself to a limited number of changes and additions and to publish the paper in a form which is still provisional, hoping that it may have some stimulating effect. My thanks are due to all those colleagues (L. S. Cousins, R. Gombrich, P. Harrison, P. Harvey, K. R. Norman, A. Piatigorsky, T. Vetter, K. Werner, A. Wezler and especially S. A. Srinivasan) who either encouraged me or urged me, by their valuable criticism, to develop or revise my ideas.

1a In: *Transzendenzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils*. Hrsg. v. G. OBERHAMMER, Wien 1978 [p. 97 ff.].

2 Cp., e.g., EB III, 178 ff.; Hōb p. 85.

3 One aspect deliberately not considered in this paper is the tendency, already discernible in some canonical texts and finally systematized in the Abhidharma schools, to regard Liberating Insight as a complex process implying repetition of the Comprehension of Truth, and thus to distinguish the first Liberating Comprehension of Truth (*satyābhisamaya* in the strict sense, or *darśana*) from its repetition(s) (*bhāvanā*), and from Enlightenment (*bodhi*, also applied to Disciples) as the final result (cf., e.g., E. LAMOTTE, *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, p. 420 ff.).

2.

My way of dealing with the textual material implies a few presuppositions which I should like to make explicit:

Firstly, I presuppose that the texts I make use of are to be taken seriously, in the sense that one has to accept that they mean what they say, and that what they mean is reasonable within its own terms. I do not think it justified to make the general assumption that a text or an idea must be inexact or vague merely because it is a religious and not a philosophical one. Apart from the difficulty, esp. in India, of drawing the borderline between these two areas, such an assumption appears quite arbitrary, and would seem especially problematical in the case of Early Buddhist texts of which the tenor is, on the whole, strikingly sober. Therefore, when there are instances of incoherence, they will have to be taken seriously and will need to be explained (e.g. by reference to textual history, see below).

The *second* presupposition concerns the relation between the descriptions of Liberating Insight or Enlightenment and the actual spiritual experience(s). Exegetical method leaves us no choice but to limit ourselves to the verbal descriptions which, as verbal descriptions, are based on concepts, and as such should be assumed to be intelligible. This does not mean that I can, by means of them, form a clear idea of the actual experience they refer to – if there was any. For we have to distinguish several possibilities. It may well be that a given description is an immediate verbalization of (a conceptualization of) an actual experience, but it may also be a secondary transformation of such a primary verbalization effected for logical, doctrinal or even tactical reasons. In other words, it may be not a description but a theory of Liberating Insight or Enlightenment. In this case, no fundamental problem of intelligibility should arise. But even where a description is really a description, i.e. a primary verbalization of actual experience, it is by no means certain that it does not convey a clear idea of the experience behind it. Whether it does or does not depends, to a large extent, on the nature of that experience. If the experience is transconceptual, its verbalization will, of course, be difficult and inadequate. But there is no cogent reason to assert that mystical experience is always totally transconceptual, and to establish a fundamental dichotomy between experiences and concepts⁴. If the verbalizations do not indicate that there is any problem implied in verbalizing the experience, it is the assumption of the wholly transconceptual character of the experience and the inadequacy of its verbalization that has to be proved, and not the presupposition that the description gives an adequate idea of the experience. In the case of Early Buddhism, most of the sources referring to Liberating Insight or Enlightenment (except perhaps some of the – rather concise – documents of the current treated in ch. H) do not seem to indicate that

4 Cp., e.g., T. VETTER in: *Transzendenzerfahrung* ... [see n. 1], p. 45.

there was any problem in verbalizing experience. Therefore, these sources would seem to refer either to experiences not felt to be in conflict with concepts or to the *theories* of Liberating Insight or Enlightenment.

The *third* presupposition is that the Suttas are to be treated as anonymous literature (the extent to which they contain elements which can safely be ascribed to the Buddha himself being still undecided). In a remarkable contribution to the symposium mentioned in n. 1, L. S. COUSINS has pointed out several important consequences of the fact that Early Buddhist literature was, for several centuries, transmitted only orally. In my opinion, however, he lays too much stress on the edificatory function of the Suttas⁵. For it can hardly be denied that they aimed, just as much, at instruction, and divergencies are caused not only by the different needs of the particular situation, e.g. the time at disposal, but also by the intentions of the instructor. There must have been, certainly, not only chanters simply choosing and combining elements from a given stock of tradition, but also preachers personally engaged in practice and theory, and it is hardly conceivable that such persons did not develop new ideas — even though they themselves need not have taken these ideas to be new in substance — and that they did not try to incorporate them into tradition by means of modification, supplementation, etc., of the already existing material, a part of which seems to have acquired a rather fixed literary form quite early. Such a process, especially when carried out on received material, is likely to have entailed certain discrepancies and incoherences. Therefore I presuppose that at least in many cases a careful application of methods of higher philological criticism will enable us to uncover the different components or strata in the pertinent material. Thus, I have tried to base my conclusions regarding the history of ideas as much as possible on observations of textual history, although want of time has prevented me from being exhaustive in this regard.

The *fourth* presupposition is closely connected with the third one. If the Sūtra-piṭaka as we have it is the result of change, also creative change, through a period of several centuries, i.e. is in fact "anonymous literature"^{5a}, the widespread assumption of the complete uniformity of its doctrine will appear doubtful. Although such a uniformity is already presupposed by the Abhidharma schools — though concretized by each of them in a different way —, it will be, from the historical, though not from the religious point of view, as inadequate as the alleged uniformity of "the doctrine" of the Upaniṣads postulated by the Vedāntist schools. In the case of Early Buddhism, it is true, the dominating personality of the founder has considerably narrowed down the scope for diverging developments, but nevertheless it seems a priori probable that such developments (not only alternative practices which may go back to the Buddha himself, but clear-cut positions tending to solidify against one another) had already started in the early period. In fact,

5 This over-emphasis on edification seems to be based on an extrapolation of the present situation into the early period, a procedure which seems to me to be not without pitfalls.

5a As for this term, see HACKER, *Kl. Schr.*, p. 8.

6 *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* 6 (1936–7), 189 ff.

the present paper will show that there seems to be, already in the canonical period, a variety of opinions with regard to the content of Liberating Insight and Enlightenment. A basic opposition has already been pointed out by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN in his admirable article 'Musīla et Nārada'⁶. Yet I hope I have been able to make some aspects more specific and to work out the outlines of a historical development⁷.

B.

According to the canonical texts, the first discourse delivered by the Buddha, containing a description of the process and content of his Enlightenment, is the *Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra* (DhCPS), which naturally has attracted the special attention of various scholars⁸. The Pāli version of this text, as is well known, has been transmitted in the Mahāvagga portion of the Vinaya (I 10 ff.) as well as in the Saṃyuttanikāya (56.11); the latter seems to have taken over the text from the Vinaya, for it includes, apart from the Sūtra proper, also a portion of the narrative framework in which it is embedded in the Vinaya. In this form, the Sūtra probably belongs to a period at least more than one hundred years later than the Buddha's Nirvāṇa⁹. Now what is significant in the context of the present paper is that even if we isolate the discourse proper, it appears to be a juxtaposition of at least three independent portions which are in fact presented as three different discourses in the version of at least one school¹⁰. There are, moreover, divergences in the sequence of the different portions, and in some versions one or even two of these portions are lacking¹¹.

7 I should, however, like to point out that the sequence of chapters in this paper does not always imply chronological sequence, e.g. in the case of chapters B and C (here the sequence is probably the other way round; cp. also BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 181 f.), or H and I, or J, K, L and M (except that the text treated in ch. K is obviously posterior to that of ch. J). Cp. also the considerations raised at the end of ch. H.

8 Cp. especially L. FEER, *Les quatre Vérités et la prédication de Benarès*, JA 1870, pp. 345–471; K. MIZUNO, *Tembōringyō ni tsuite*, Bukkyō Kenkyū 1/1970, pp. 92–114 (cp. also the references to earlier Japanese investigations into the DhCPS on p. 114 of MIZUNO's paper); H. KUSAMA, *Tembōringyō no ichi kōsatsu*, IBK 46/1975, pp. 719–722. Cp. also E. WALDSCHMIDT, *Vergleichende Analyse des Catuspariśatsūtra* (in: *Festschrift für Walther Schubring*, Hamburg 1951), p. 96 ff.; BAREAU, *Recherches*, pp. 172 ff.

9 Cp. E. FRAUWALLNER, *The Earliest Vinaya* (Rome 1956), p. 54. Cp. also BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 180.

10 Cp. WALDSCHMIDT, loc. cit. [see n. 8]; FEER, op. cit. [see n. 8], pp. 393 ff.

11 EĀ_C 593 b 24 ff., e.g., contains only the first portion (cp. BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 179; cp. also the text translated ib. p. 173); in EĀ_C 619 a 8 ff., we find the second and the third portion only, whereas texts like SN 56.12 and the (Mūla-?)Sārvāstivāda version of the DhCPS (esp. SĀ_C No. 379, T 110, and AKVv pp. 579 f.; cp. MIZUNO, op. cit. [see n. 8], pp. 102–103; KUSAMA, loc. cit. [see n. 8]; BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 179) are confined to the third portion only. According to KUSAMA, the omission of the other portions in the (Mūla-?)Sārvāstivāda version is a deliberate change.

The third portion is the one which explicitly refers to the c o n t e n t of Enlightenment, defining it, as is well known, as the comprehension, illumination or vision¹² of

- a) what the four Noble Truths are,
- b) that they are to be fully known (*pariññeya*), abandoned (*prahātavya*), realized (*sāksātkartavya*), and practised (*bhāvayitavya*), respectively, and
- c) that this task has been fulfilled¹³.

It is not likely that this rather sophisticated and schematic account of the Enlightenment of the Buddha is the original one^{13a}.

By the way, as L. FEER¹⁴ has already pointed out, there would be no difference between abandoning *duḥkhasamudaya* and realizing *duḥkhanirodha* if these two Truths are interpreted, as they are in the second portion of the DhCPS, as Craving (*trṣṇā/taṇhā*), and Cessation or Abandoning (*tyāga/cāga*) of Craving, respectively. Repetitiveness can only be avoided by assuming that in the third portion the concept of '*duḥkhanirodha*' is understood differently: viz. not, in analogy to '*duḥkhasamudaya*'^{14a}, as "that by which Suffering ceases", but as "Cessation^{14b} of Suffering". At the moment I am unable to decide the chronological implications of such an interpretation. But in any case it would confirm the assumption that the third and the second portion of the DhCPS, viz. the account of Enlightenment and the explanation of the four Noble Truths, are of heterogeneous origin.

C.

There is another well known account of the Buddha's Enlightenment, viz. in Suttas like MN No. 4^{14c}, which, however, corresponds to a description of the

12 The quasi-synonyms used in the text include terms referring to the intellectual sphere (*ñāṇa*, *paññā*, *vijjā*) as well as expressions belonging to the sphere of vision (*cakkhu*, *āloka*), thus indicating some kind of intellectual vision, or comprehension which at the same time is, or has the evidence of, direct experience.

13 The divergencies of arrangement found in the different versions may be left out of consideration here.

13a Cp. also BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 180.

14 Op. cit. [see n. 8], p. 422.

14a Being identified with Craving, *duḥkhasamudaya* can only mean "that by or from which Suffering originates". Cp. also AKBh 328, 13.

14b In the present context it seems preferable to understand *nirodha*, in analogy to *samudaya*, in an intransitive sense. In the canonical definition of the *nirodhasatya*, *nirodha* occurs in composition with *virāga* ("fading away") – although, it is true, the following quasi-synonyms, viz. *cāga* etc., are transitive –. Cp. also clusters of quasi-synonyms like *khaya*, *vaya*, *virāga*, *nirodha* (e. g. DN II 67), where all the words with which *nirodha* is associated are clearly intransitive.

14c = MN I 21 ff.; No. 19 = I 117; No. 36 = I 247 ff.; No. 85 = Nālandā-ed. II 331 f.; No. 100 = Nālandā-ed. II 495 f.

Liberating Insight of Disciples that forms part of a stereotyped detailed description of the Path of Liberation (= *Ster.Det.Descr.*) occurring, though with various additions, in quite a few Sutta and Vinaya texts¹⁵. In these texts, Enlightenment or Liberating Insight takes place in the Fourth Dhyāna, after the mind has been directed towards the knowledge of (or: leading to)¹⁶ the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsavaṇaṃ khayāṇāṇa*). Firstly, insight¹⁷ is won with regard to the four Noble Truths, then with regard to the Cankers (*āsava/āsava*), their origination^{17a} (*samudaya*), their cessation^{17b} (*nirodha*), and the path leading to the latter. This insight entails¹⁸ that the mind (*citta*) is liberated from the Cankers which are now concretized as [Craving for] sensual pleasures (*kāma*), [Craving for] existence (*bhava*),

- 15 Cp. also FRAUWALLNER, *G.i.Ph.* I, 162 ff + 467, n. 86 f. – There are many (complete or incomplete) versions in MN (e.g. No. 27 = I 179 ff.; No. 51 = I 344 ff.; No. 60 = I 412 f.; etc.), DN (considerably enlarged version: e.g. I 62 ff., 171 ff., 206 ff., etc.), and AN (e.g. 3.58 and 59 = I 163 ff.; 4.198 = II 208 ff.; 5.75 and 76 = III 92 f. and 100; etc.), but, as far as I can see, there is none in SN! Cp. also the analogous observations in n. 55 and 69! This seems to indicate that the monks specializing in a certain Nikāya may also have formed a (more or less coherent) group with certain doctrinal (or spiritual) predilections.
- 16 The term seems to be ambiguous (see CPD s. v. *āsavakkhayaṇāṇa*; cp. also, e.g., It 104; Vi 547a 13–16; ASBh 128, 23 f.). If BAREAU (*Recherches*, p. 85) is right in assuming that we should start from the stereotyped canonical description of the sixth *abhiññā* as given, e. g., in MN I 35 f., which clearly points to the meaning “knowledge of [the fact that] the Cankers have vanished”, it would seem that the *Ster.Det.Descr.* has extended the concept in order to include under it not only the knowledge of being liberated but also the insight which effects Liberation.
- 17 *abbaññāsiṃ* in the autobiographical versions, but *jānāti* (Skt. *prajānāti*: cp. AKVy 654, 21 ff.) in the versions describing the Path of Liberation of the Disciple. Afterwards, however, both versions refer to this comprehension by means of “*jānato . . . passato*” which seems to lead to the same conclusion as has been drawn in n. 12. Cp. also ERGARDT, *Faith*, pp. 11 ff.
- 17a Perhaps more exactly: “that by which they originate” (cp. n. 14a).
- 17b Perhaps more exactly: “that by which they cease” (cp. end of ch. B).
- 18 Lit.: “The mind of him who knows thus, who sees thus, is liberated . . .” (*tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato . . . cittaṃ vimuccati*). That there is a temporal or even causal sequence is indicated by the use of the aorist (a typical function of which is the “Fortschritt der Handlung in einer Erzählung”: see H. BECHERT, Über den Gebrauch der indikativischen Tempora im Pali, Münchner St. z. Sprachw. 3/1953 [rev. Nachdr. 1958], p. 58) in the “Enlightenment version”, and by the introductory *tassa* the anaphorical function of which is especially obvious in that same version: *tassa me evaṃ jānato . . . cittaṃ vimuccittha*. Much of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* is likewise formed by statements introduced by anaphorical *sa*, etc. (e.g. *so evaṃ samāhite citte . . . , so idaṃ dukkhaṃ ti . . .*), the verb being in the present in the paradigmatic “Disciple’s-Liberation version”, but in the aorist in the autobiographical “Enlightenment version” (although in this version also the present is used in the description of *pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa* and *cutūpapātañāṇa*; see n. 75). – The participles *jānato* and *passato* may be understood in a durative sense (“knowing”, “seeing”), whereas *jānāti* (and all the more so *prajānāti*, cp. RENOUE, Grammaire sanscrite, p. 144, who states that *pra-* also forms “ingressives”) and *abbaññāsiṃ* may mean “to come to know”, “to comprehend”. As for *pra-* and *abhi-*, see ERGARDT, *Faith*, pp. 11 f., although there may be room for further investigation.

and Ignorance (*avidyā*)¹⁹. Finally this Liberation is known²⁰ and the certitude is won that there will be no further rebirth.

In spite of the fact that this description, as the basis of so many enlarged or recast versions, must be comparatively old, it too cannot be accepted as representing the original account of Enlightenment^{20a}, for the fourfold set of insight into the Cankers, their origination, etc., — which is, by the way, missing in some versions²¹ — has, obviously for the sake of symmetry, been modelled on the fourfold pattern of the Noble Truths, although this pattern hardly makes sense in the case of the Cankers as they are specified immediately afterwards in our text²². What, e.g., is the origination or cause^{22a} (*samudaya*) of the Cankers? According to two other passages²³, it is Ignorance (*avidyā*); but Ignorance itself is, in our text as well as in the two other passages, enumerated as one of the Cankers! Even apart from this absurdity it is obvious that the question of the origin or cause of Suffering is prior to the question of the cause of the cause of Suffering, the latter presupposing the solution of the former. In fact, the pattern of the Cankers, their origin, etc., is, apart from the present context, only found in a very few places²⁴,

19 I understand *kāma*- and *bhavāsava* as Tatpuruṣas ("Canker referring to..."), whereas *aviḥ-jāsava* is obviously a Karmadhāraya ("Canker consisting in Ignorance", cp. CPD p. 470).

20 Lit. "After [it, i.e. the mind,] has been liberated, there is (or: arises) the knowledge 'it [i.e. the mind] is liberated'" (*vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti*). I do not see another possibility of interpretation of this sentence in a manner that fits both grammar and context (*c i t t a m vimuccī*). Cp. also VON HINÜBER, *Kasussyntax*, p. 301; ERGARDT, *Faith*, pp. 48 f., esp. n. 7. — As for occurrences of this sentence in a somewhat different context where *citta* is not mentioned in the preceding sentences, see n. 69.

20a Cp. also BAREAU, *Recherches*, pp. 72 ff., esp. the reference, on p. 86 (bottom) f., to the heterogeneity of the elements of the last paragraph of the *Ster.Det.Descr.*

21 (a) MSV II 184,16 ff. ≈ AKVy 654,20 ff.; cp. also Saṅgītiparyāya (T 1536) p. 391 a 29 ff. (cp. V. STACHE-ROSEN, *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im Älteren Buddhismus II*, Berlin 1968, p. 92); (b) EĀc 802 a 21 ff. — As will become clear in the following exposition, in spite of the fact that the comprehension of the *āsrava*s, their origination, etc., does not seem to have, from the outset, formed part of the c o n c e p t i o n of Enlightenment followed by the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, I do not feel it necessary to consider its absence (as (BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 87, does) to be a feature of the original form of the t e x t of the *Ster.Det.Descr.*; I should prefer to regard it rather as a later omission which may have been motivated by the development of the theory of Liberating Insight in the (Mūla-) Sarvāstivāda school(s) (see ch. N. 1).

22 As there is no indication which would suggest or even allow one to regard the sentence which contains the specification of the Cankers, or at least the respective portion of the sentence, to be a later addition, I do not think that it is possible to avoid the difficulty by presupposing, in the fourfold pattern, an older, different concept of 'Cankers' (cp. F. ENOMOTO, *āsrava* ni tsuite, in: IBK 53/1978, pp. 158 f.; do., *āsrava* (ro) no seiritsu ni tsuite, in: Bukkyō Shigaku Kenkyū 22.1/1979, pp. 17 ff.), or at least a less specified one (cp. N. KASHIWAHARA, *Ro* ni tsuite, in: IBK 52/1978, p. 657) which may be conceived of as not having included Ignorance.

22a See n. 17a.

23 MN I 55 and AN III 414.

24 I know only of the passages quoted in the preceding note.

whereas the fourfold pattern of Suffering, its origination, etc., is extremely frequent.

In spite of this consideration — which is only concerned with the relative chronology of the fourfold pattern of the Cankers (*āsrava*), their origination (*āsrava-samudaya*), etc., as an element of the content of Liberating Insight or Enlightenment, but not with the antiquity of the notion of *āsravas* as such²⁵ —, I do not think it probable that the fourfold insight into the Cankers, their origination, etc., is a later addition to our text, for it will have become clear from the above sketch that 'Canker(s)' (*āsrava/āsava*) seems to be a key term of the whole passage^{25a}. Therefore it seems preferable to consider the whole "*āsrava*-layer" as genuine^{25b}. This need not imply that the portion referring to the insight into the four Noble Truths, though older in itself, is a later addition in the framework of our text, for in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it seems much more probable that it, too, was incorporated already at the time of composition, because it was, or was felt to be, an authentic element of the description of Liberating Insight or Enlightenment which could only be supplemented but could not be supplanted.

If this is correct, we can infer that even before the composition of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* there was a fixed association between Liberation, or at least Enlightenment (somehow implying Liberation), and insight into the Noble Truths. There may have been even a clear-cut view or theory according to which Liberation was achieved by insight — seemingly a kind of intellectual vision — into the four Noble Truths. In fact, such a view is well documented in quite a few canonical texts including verses from the Suttanipāṭa²⁶, and is essentially in keeping with the starting point, though not with the elaboration, of the DhCPS. Moreover, we may state that according to such a view Liberation will, implicitly or explicitly, have included, or consisted of, the vanishing of the Cankers²⁷ (which is said to be effected by the

25 As for the latter, cp. L. ALSDORF, *Les études Jaina* (Collège de France 1965), p. 4 f.; but in view of the facts that the *Ster.Det.Descr.* explicitly starts from a reinterpreted, Buddhist concept of *āsravas* and that there seems to be no clue permitting us to question the authenticity of the respective sentence (see n. 22), the criticism ALSDORF raises against FRAUWALLNER does not appear to be justified.

25a Cp. also BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 87: „... les impuretés qui sont le véritable sujet du paragraphe”.

25b Otherwise BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 87 (see also n. 21).

26 Sn 726; 267. As for other texts, cp. esp. SN 56.1 ff. — It is not important, for the present investigation which is concerned with the history of ideas, whether these materials, as literary (of course not necessarily written) documents, took shape before the usual version of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* or afterwards, continuing or re-establishing the earlier stage of development, provided that this earlier stage, as I have tried to show, can actually be inferred from the *Ster.Det.Descr.* itself.

27 At least of the “Cankers” in the older, unspecified meaning (see n. 22). — In view of the account of Enlightenment given in MN I 167 (see end of ch. C), the possibility should perhaps be envisaged that at first Liberation was primarily conceived as liberation from Suffering. Cp., in this connection, also the considerations advanced by BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 87 f. Cp. also DhP 190–192.

insight into [nothing but] the four Noble Truths in, e.g., SN 56.25) or -- to keep to the terminology of the stereotyped canonical explanation of the four Noble Truths -- the cessation of Craving (*trṣṇā/taṇhā*), which arises out of the insight into the four Noble Truths according to SN 56.21. Finally, it should be noted that, in both the Buddha's Enlightenment and the Disciple's Liberation, final knowledge or awareness of being liberated seems to have been regarded as an essential element, for it is found in both versions of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* as well as in the DhCPS²⁸; and it is moreover confirmed by the autobiographical account of Enlightenment given in MN No. 26 (I 167) which seems to represent a different (according to BAREAU²⁹: the most ancient) tradition and does not give any information about the method by which Enlightenment or Liberation was won but only has the Buddha proclaim that he had found (*ajjhagamam*) Nirvāṇa^{29a} which is supreme salvation (*yogakkhema*) free from birth, old age, disease, death, sorrow, and impurity (or affliction?) (*asankiliṭṭha*)^{29b}, and that moreover the insight had arisen in him that he had definitely attained Liberation and was no longer subject to rebirth.

D.

Yet, even such a view of Liberation and Liberating Insight is not without problems, if we try to understand it as referring to a psychologically plausible process. Such an attempt may seem to be inappropriate in the case of mystical experience. But -- apart from the question whether this is true -- we are

28 SN V 423; *ñāṇam ca pana me dassanam udapādi: "akuppā me vimutti, ayam antimā jāti, natth' idāni punabbhavo" ti.* -- In my opinion, this sentence (which is clearly marked as a further event by *ca* and *pana*) does not fit the preceding sentence in which the Buddha states that it is only after the twelvefold insight with regard to the four Noble Truths that he publicly professed to have attained Enlightenment; for the Buddha's public profession of Enlightenment clearly is a later event which must have been preceded by the knowledge of his being enlightened, implying the knowledge of his being liberated. Logically and stylistically (*udapādi!*), the above sentence (which is, by the way, the same formula as in the account of Enlightenment given in MN I 167 [see end of ch. C]) would fit in much better immediately after the description of the twelvefold insight into the four Noble Truths.

29 BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 72–74.

29a It is tempting to connect this statement with the doctrine of Liberation treated in ch. H, according to which Liberating Insight seems to have been understood as a mystical experience of unconditioned Nirvāṇa. But in the present passage (MN I 167) *ajjhagamam* does not seem to have agnoseological meaning; in view of the object *yogakkhema* ("Salvation"), and being contrasted with *pariyesamāno* ("searching"), it is probably to be understood as "I found" (in an existential sense); cp. passages like MN I 140,4 and SN I 122,29; cp. also AN I 162,29 (*devalokaṃ ca te yanti, kule vā idha jāyare, anupubbena nibbānaṃ adhigacchanti.* . .) where agnoseological meaning seems to be excluded.

29b Cp. BAREAU, *Recherches*, pp. 87 f.

not yet dealing with experience itself but with its description or even with a (first?) theory of it. At least in the latter case, it seems reasonable to expect a psychologically plausible process, especially considering the fact that in Early Buddhism, as far as we can see, the cause of Bondage to be destroyed by Liberating Insight is clearly a psychological factor (or a set of such factors): either Craving (*trṣṇā/tanhā*) or the Cankers interpreted as including both Craving and Ignorance (*avidyā*).

Of course, it is easy to understand that Ignorance may be destroyed by the comprehension of the four Noble Truths, especially if Ignorance is to be understood as ignorance or non-comprehension of the four Noble Truths (cp., e.g., SN 56.17), thus being automatically sublated by their comprehension. But is it plausible that the insight into the four Noble Truths effects the vanishing of Craving? Is the content of Liberating Insight, i.e. the four Noble Truths, such as to explain the immediate cessation of Craving? It is obvious that it would be of no help to intercalate the cessation of Ignorance³⁰, because, as already stated, Ignorance refers to the same content. Moreover, as Ignorance is not mentioned in the traditional explanation of the Truth of the Origination [of Suffering] (*samudayasatya*), its original presence in connection with Liberating Insight, understood as comprehension of the four Noble Truths only, will appear doubtful³¹ (in fact, in SN 56.21 only Craving (*tanhā*) is mentioned). Thus, what has to be investigated is whether the content of Liberating Insight, i.e. the four Noble Truths, is such as to make plausible the notion that its comprehension effects the vanishing of Craving.

In the case of the Truth of Suffering, it is true, such a relation is evident: the full realization of the fact that all existence is suffering can easily be understood as stopping all craving for such existence and for the desired objects pertaining to it. But in the case of the remaining Truths, a direct psychological effect of this kind is hardly conceivable. The knowledge that Craving is the cause of Suffering and that, therefore, Suffering will stop if Craving is stopped will motivate a person to exert himself to stop Craving, but will not by itself stop Craving automatically. This is still more evident in the case of the Truth of the Path: in order to stop Craving, it is obviously not sufficient to know the path leading to the cessation of Suffering, but it is necessary to practise it, and knowing it should precede practising it. In any case, knowledge of what the Path is does not seem to have any direct psychological relation to the cessation of Craving. Thus, it is difficult to understand the cessation of Craving as the psychological effect of the comprehension of the Noble Truths as a set of four, the latter three appearing to be superfluous for that purpose.

30 In fact, there is no indication that such an intercalation was intended in the *Ster.Det. Descr.*; such an indication could, e.g., consist in liberation from Ignorance being enumerated first, and not last as it actually is (in accordance, of course, with the usual sequence of the enumeration of the three *āsravas*).

31 Cp. FRAUWALLNER, *G.i.Ph.* I, 215 ff.

E.

The result of the preceding investigation is that the assumption of a psychologically plausible process is not confirmed and that it is necessary to seek a different explanation for this early Buddhist description or theory of Liberating Insight.

I can only offer a hypothetical solution. The *Ster.Det.Descr.* which was the starting point of the preceding considerations is transmitted, as I said before³², both as a description of the Liberating Path of Disciples and as a description of the Buddha's Enlightenment (including Liberation)³³. The above attempt at a psychologically plausible explanation started from the aspect of Liberation and from the function of the comprehension of the four Noble Truths as Liberating Insight. The situation will be altogether different if we start from the aspect of the Buddha's Enlightenment, although, as far as I can see, the possibility that the "Disciple's-Liberation pattern" of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* may be, in its literary aspect, the older version of the text³⁴ cannot be ruled out. Whatever the right solution of this specific question of literary history, from the point of view of the history of ideas, the Buddha's Enlightenment must have been the starting point. On this assumption, the difficulties which have arisen appear to admit of a solution, for the psychological or spiritual situation of the Buddha's own Enlightenment should be regarded as differing considerably from that of the Liberating Insight of a disciple of his. To conclude from the analysis of sources carried out in chs. B and C, the Buddha's personal Enlightenment, as an experience, must have been considered to have contained two essentially distinct aspects. One is the discovery of the four Noble Truths^{34a} summarizing the essentials of Bondage and Liberation as hitherto unknown³⁵. The other is the

32 See ch. C.

33 The initial portion of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* (*idha tathāgato loke uppajjati*, etc.) does not fit into a description of the Buddha's own Path of Liberation. It is, in fact, missing in the respective Suttas (MN Nos. 4, etc., [cp. n. 14c.]), which only contain the final portion beginning with the entrance into the First Dhyāna.

34 ERGARDT, *Faith*, p. 83, n. 75, seems to incline to the assumption that the autobiographical Suttas of the MN are the oldest, though he expressly states that it is merely a working hypothesis.

34a One might qualify: the discovery of what came to be schematized or schematically conceptualized and verbalized afterwards as the four Noble Truths. But the pertinent sources do not indicate any difficulty in verbalizing the experience. Moreover, such an assumption would be meaningful only if the account is a genuine reflection of the Buddha's actual experience, which, however can hardly be taken for granted (see below).

35 Cp. the expression *pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu* in the DhCPS (SN V 422). – It might be argued that some (or even the essential) aspects of the four Noble Truths should have been known to the Buddha, and even to other ascetics, already before Enlightenment, but – in terms of the view that Enlightenment substantially means comprehension of the four Noble Truths – such a "knowledge" would be bound to have been only abstract or tentative (a kind of practical working hypothesis), whereas in Enlightenment it is supplied with or based on a kind of experiential confirmation. In the case of the Truth of Suffering, especially, such a confirmation could be regarded as consisting in a supranormal compre-

certitude that he himself had achieved Liberation, i.e. that for him the cause(s) of bondage had vanished and that there would be no rebirth. In view of MN I 167 (see end of ch. C) it may seem doubtful whether this view of Enlightenment, esp. its first element, viz. the discovery of the four Noble Truths, is a genuine reflection of what the Buddha's Enlightenment, as an experience, actually was³⁶. Even if we assume it to be authentic, there may, but need not necessarily, have been a clear-cut temporal sequence of these two elements in experience itself. But some kind of sequence was almost inevitable in subsequent conceptualization and verbalization; still more so if that analysis of Enlightenment, or one of its elements, is not an authentic reflection of the Buddha's experience but a later theoretical construction in order to vindicate, as the content of Enlightenment, what was, or had come to be, the most fundamental Truth of the Buddhist doctrine. In any case, the sequence of the two elements came to be settled in the way that the discovery of the four Noble Truths preceded the awareness of being liberated³⁷, and this temporal sequence seems to have been understood as implying a causal one, to the effect that Liberation, which is presupposed by the awareness of one's being liberated, was considered to be the effect of the discovery of the four Noble Truths. Interpreted in this way, the Buddha's Enligh-

hension of the universality of Suffering; and it is perhaps for the sake of providing, in the form of a kind of vision of the whole range of Transmigration, an experiential frame or basis for such a comprehension that in the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, be it from the outset or by some later revision (cp. n. 75), insight into the four Noble Truths is preceded by the remembrance of [one's own] former lives (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa*) and the observation of the dying and being reborn [of other living beings] (*cutūpapātāñāṇa*). In the case of the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of the Path on the other hand, confirmation may be more likely to have consisted in the experience of success: Enlightenment, including Liberation and knowledge of one's being liberated, makes it certain that, by the cessation of Craving, Suffering has really come to an end, and that the path which had been followed tentatively is really the Path of Liberation. In the case of the Truth of Origination, both kinds of confirmation appear possible (as for the first alternative, cp. the sentence *yathā-kammūpage satte pajānāti* in the description of *cutūpapātāñāṇa*, which, however, is not in keeping with the canonical explanation of the Truth of Origination as Craving; cp. also BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 90).

36 Cp. BAREAU, *Recherches*, pp. 91 and 376. When, however, BAREAU (op. cit. p. 180) deduces, from his analysis of the accounts of Enlightenment, the further conclusion that "la thèse des quatre Vérités se serait développée assez tard", this does not seem to be convincing, for why shouldn't the pattern of the four Noble Truths have already existed for some period before it came to be regarded as the content of Enlightenment?

37 If we start from the aspect, considered in n. 35, of Enlightenment as a confirmation of the four Noble Truths, already accepted as a kind of working hypothesis, by the experience of success (viz. Liberation) – and not from the aspect of Enlightenment as a first discovery, or at least first full comprehension, of those Truths –, the opposite sequence would seem more natural; for to know that what one had presupposed to be the Path of Salvation, etc., is actually the Path, etc., would presuppose that one has actually realized one's Liberation. The fact that such a sequence does not seem to be testified to may indicate that the aspect of Enlightenment as confirmation by the experience of success was not considered when the respective texts were formulated.

tenment could be understood as a paradigmatic realization of Liberation to be imitated by the Disciple: the Disciple who wanted to root out Craving had to reproduce, on his part, that very discovery of or insight into the Noble Truths as a set of four, although in his case this was definitely no longer an original discovery, but only the full comprehension or experiential confirmation of what he had already learnt and believed before³⁸.

The question how the Insight into the four Noble Truths could have the effect of immediately destroying Craving (or the Cankers) and thus effecting Liberation need not have arisen in the beginning, due to the facticity of this effect, undoubted at least in the case of the Buddha; but it is also conceivable that its possibility was taken for granted because the Vedic belief in the extraordinary power of truth and knowledge may still have been influential among early Buddhists³⁹.

F.

The principle that Enlightenment and, analogously, Liberating Insight are essentially characterized (and perhaps rendered effective) by the fact that, irrespective of psychological plausibility, their content must consist of, or at least contain, the most fundamental truth, can be observed to have been valid also in later periods⁴⁰, for we find that such concepts also were taken to be constitutive or essential to both as are expressive of what was, later on, regarded to be the most fundamental truth. E.g., in some obviously more or less later descriptions of Enlightenment or Liberating Insight, the Comprehension of the four Noble Truths

38 Such a provisional belief in the four Noble Truths may have been included in the first member of the Eightfold Path, viz. Right View (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi/sammādiṭṭhi*) which seems to correspond to *dharmam sutvā tathāgate saddhā* (etc.) in the *Ster.Det.Descr.* (cp. E. FRAUWALLNER, *G.i.Ph.* I, 185, and the use of the term *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* in Jainism in the sense of "rechter Glaube", "Rechtgläubigkeit"): see W. SCHUBRING, *Die Lehre der Jainas*, 1935, pp. 187 and 204; cp. also H. EIMER, *Skizzen des Erlösungsweges in buddhistischen Begriffsreihen*, Bonn 1976, pp. 33 and 37). But already in the canonical texts Right View is defined as knowledge (*ñāṇa*) with regard to the four Noble Truths (EIMER, op. cit., p. 22). Of course, this must be regarded as a later development if "knowledge" has to be understood as equivalent to "full comprehension", but it does not seem to be completely irreconcilable with the original meaning from the point of view of content.

39 Cp. D. SCHLINGLOFF, *Die Religion des Buddhismus*, I (Berlin 1962), p. 71. This possibility would seem to suggest itself especially if the Liberation envisaged by means of insight into the four Noble Truths was, in the beginning, essentially liberation from Suffering (cp. n. 27), which would imply that there was a magical correlation of the content and the effect of Liberating Insight (see end of ch. G.2 where an analogous relationship is considered with regard to the *āśravas*).

40 Of course, there is also the opposite tendency to set off the Buddha and his Enlightenment against the Disciples and their Liberating Insight, the Buddha's Enlightenment tending to imply Omniscience.

is supplemented⁴¹ or even supplanted⁴² by the Comprehension of Origination-in-Dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*) — in its two forms of *anuloma* and *pratiloma* corresponding to *samudaya-* and *nirodhasatya*, respectively⁴³ —, a fact which is easily understood if we bear in mind that, as an expression of the most fundamental soteriologically relevant truth, *pratītyasamutpāda* seems to have gradually superseded the four Noble Truths. In most of the Hīnayāna schools, however, it was in its turn later superseded by the doctrine of the non-existence of a substantial self or person ([*pudgala-*] *nairātmya*). Accordingly, it is not surprising to find this new fundamental truth, too, becoming the major content of Liberating Insight, which, e.g., according to one of three alternative explanations found in the Śāriputrābhīdharma⁴⁴, consists in a realization of all the four Noble Truths under the aspect of “*Lack of Self*”⁴⁵. The development could be pursued still further into Mahāyāna, where, however, its result converges with the result of other developments.

G.

These other developments seem to have started quite early and would in fact seem to have been, at least, co-motivated by the awakening of the awareness that there should be a psychologically plausible relation between the content of Liberating Insight and its effect, viz. the vanishing of Craving or of the Cankers. Before dealing with the major trends of these developments, we should, however, return for a moment to those elements of the DhCPS and of the characterization of Liberating Insight given in the *Ster.Det.Descr.* that go beyond the view, common to both texts, that Liberation is effected by insight into the four Noble Truths.

41 Cp. E. WALDSCHMIDT, *Von Ceylon bis Turfan*, pp. 410 f.

42 Cp. J. NOBEL, *Udrāyaṇa*, König von Roruka, p. 8; cp. also texts like SN 12.65.

43 Cp. SN 12.65. — It seems possible to regard also *duḥkhasatya* as virtually included in (*anuloma-*)*pratītyasamutpāda* (esp. in the members *jāti* and *jarāmarāṇa*), but an inclusion of *mārgasatya* and consequently a complete parallelization of *pratītyasamutpāda* and the four Noble Truths (as, e.g., advocated by ISSAI FUNAHASHI, *Genshi bukkyō shisō no kenkyū*, Kyōto 1978, p. 132 f.) seems to overshoot the mark.

44 T 1548, p. 595 a 3 ff. — Cp. also Paṭiś II 105: *katih'ākārehi cattāri saccāni ekapaṭive-dhāni? catūh'ākārehi . . . : tathaṭṭhena, anattaṭṭhena, . . .*; Paṭiś-a 594: *anattaṭṭhena 'ti: catunnaṃ saccānaṃ attavirahitattā . . .* (in the latter passage, *sacca* has, of course, to be understood in a collective sense as denoting the totality of those *dhammas* the nature of which is Suffering, etc.).

45 This Description of Liberating Insight could also be regarded as a kind of compromise between the traditional description and the attempt to establish a psychologically plausible relation between the content and the effect of Liberating Insight by reducing it to a comprehension of the *negative* nature of existence (cp. ch. 1). But such a negative contemplation is not easily seen to be appropriate or spiritually purposeful in the case of *mārgasatya*, still less so in the case of *nirodhasatya*.

1.

In the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, the Comprehension of the four Noble Truths was supplemented by an analogous Comprehension of the *āsravas*, their origination, etc. According to FRAUWALLNER⁴⁶, this addition is due to the doctrinal reason of including, in the content of Liberating Insight, the later, more complete specification of the Cause of Suffering as Craving and Ignorance, both elements being comprised in the Buddhist interpretation of the old term ‘Cankers’ (*āsrava*). According to this explanation, the addition of the Comprehension of the *āsravas*, etc., can be understood as following the principle stated in ch. F. that the content of Enlightenment, as well as of Liberating Insight as its reproduction, should include the fundamental or decisive soteriologically relevant truth. At the same time, the special emphasis on the Cankers means a shift of the focus of attention from the final aim of Liberating Insight (viz. the cessation of Suffering) to the immediate one (viz. the cessation of the Cankers). This may seem to amount to establishing a more direct relation between the content of Liberating Insight and its immediate effect, i.e. the cessation of the Cankers^{46a}. Yet, this relation does not yet appear as a psychologically plausible one but still seems to be influenced by the magical presupposition that to know the essence, origination, etc.⁴⁷, of something means to gain power over it, including the power of immediately destroying it⁴⁸.

2.

The elaboration found in the DhCPS is quite different. The second set of statements (*dukkham parinñeyyam*, etc.) makes it explicit that mere comprehension, especially of the origination or Cause of Suffering and the Path towards its cessation, is not sufficient; Enlightenment includes the knowledge that the Cause has to be abandoned and that the Path has to be practised. But this insight is immediately followed by the knowledge that this task has already been fulfilled – which is, especially with regard to the Buddha, easily understood in the case of the Path but leaves us with the question of how in the case of the abandonment of the Cause. What may be important is that the text, by introduc-

46 FRAUWALLNER, *G.i.Ph.* I, 215 ff.

46a Cp. also BAREAU (*Recherches*, p. 87) who says that the sentence referring to the insight into the *āsravas*, their origination, etc., is “un élément de compromis relativement tardif inventé pour pallier un peu cette hétérogénéité . . .”. I am, however, not at all certain whether the sentence has to be regarded as a later accretion in the framework of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* as a piece of (oral) literature (see n. 21).

47 From this point of view, the application of the fourfold pattern of the Noble Truths to the Cankers may, in spite of the difficulties presented by its concrete interpretation (see ch. C), appear to be not without purpose.

48 Cp., perhaps, combinations like *saṃyojanāni ñassati vā dakkhati vā pajahissati vā* (MN I 435). – Cp. also the remark in n. 39.

ing the second set of statements, establishes something like a second level of comprehension at which what especially is to be known is only *duḥkhasatya* and, in view of the existential-gnoseological ambivalence of the term *sāḁsātkartavya*, perhaps also *nirodhasatya*. This second level is obviously the level of Liberating Insight as an experience benefiting only the individual concerned, whereas the threefold comprehension of the four Truths describes the Buddha's Enlightenment, which, though somehow implying the Buddha's personal Liberation, is primarily regarded as the Discovery of Truth soteriologically relevant for all living beings. The fact that in the DhCPS on the second level (i.e. that of individually liberating insight) it is only *duḥkha*- and perhaps *nirodhasatya* which form the content of Comprehension may actually indicate or reflect an attempt at establishing a psychologically plausible relation between the content of Liberating Insight and its effect. For it is clear that in principle there are two possibilities (admitting of course of the possibility of the two being combined): in a psychologically plausible process, the cessation of Craving could be achieved either by realizing the negative, disgusting character of mundane existence (i.e. by realizing *duḥkhasatya*), or by realizing the positive, peaceful or blissful character of the cessation of mundane existence (i.e. Nirvāṇa, which could easily, and in fact has, become the meaning of '*nirodhasatya*'). In fact we can find, in the canonical texts, two further types of descriptions or theories of Liberating Insight, each exactly corresponding to one of these two possibilities.

H.

The two theories to be considered in this connection have already been contrasted by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN in his article noted above, viz. "Musīla et Nārada"⁴⁹. Starting from Suttas like SN 12.68 and AN 6.46, DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN has shown that besides a "rationalist" conception of Liberating Insight there was also a "mystic" one (and that there was even debate between the adherents of these positions which some Suttas try to reconcile). According to the "mystic" view, Liberation requires that Nirvāṇa or the Sphere beyond the reach of death (*amatā dhātu*) is realized or touched "by the body" (*kāyena phusitvā*), an expression that presumably intends immediate personal experience⁵⁰ which is considered to be a temporary anticipation, still in this life, of the state of Nirvāṇa (which is attained definitively only after death).

This state of "Nirvāṇa in this life" is especially connected with the Cessation of [all] Ideations⁵¹ and Feelings (*saṁjñāved(ay)itanirodha/saññāvedayitaniro-*

49 Cp. n. 6.

50 Cp. Uttarādhyaṇa 5.23 (referred to in AKp VIII, 210, n. 3) where *kāṇa phāsa* is used with the rules of conduct for householders as its object. — Cp. also TSi 345 b 3–5.

51 The term *saṁjñā/sañña* still presents considerable difficulties and would require a monograph of its own. The CPD, so far, rather wilfully wavers between "perception" (e.g. s.

dha)⁵². In fact, *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, as is well known, is the culminating point of the eight "Liberations"^{52a} (*vimokṣa*) as well as of the nine Successive States [of meditative concentration] (*anupūrvavihāra/anupubbavihāra*)⁵³, being, in the latter list, preceded by the four *dhyānas* and the four States Beyond Visible Matter (*ārupya/arūpa*)⁵⁴. Yet; it is difficult to decide whether these lists must be understood to be, in each case and from the outset, expressive of a Path leading to Nirvāṇa also in the sense of the destruction of Craving or of the Cankers.

vv. *ākīñcaññāyatana-saññā*, *ākāśānañcāyatana-saññā*, *upadhi-saññitā*, *arūpa-saññin*) and "conception" (e.g. s.v. *anicca-saññā*), "idea" (s.v. *uddhumātaka-saññā*), "notion" (ib.), "consciousness" (ib.; cp. also s.v. *asaññā*, etc.), a comprehensive and systematical treatment of the term being, of course, reserved for the lemma *saññā*. My rendering "ideation" follows RUNE E. A. JOHANSSON, *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism* (Oxford 1979), a book, which contains (pp. 92 ff.) the most useful discussion of the term *saññā* I have come across so far. Yet I should like to emphasize that, as far as I can see, *saṃjñā/saññā* is hardly ever perception in the sense of mere *sensation* (or in the sense of the German word "Wahrnehmung"), not even in passages like MN I 293 (JOHANSSON, p. 92) or VisM XIV.3 ff. In my opinion, *saṃjñā/saññā* always includes the aspect of a clear and definite consciousness or apperception of the object, of a grasping or mental representation or imagination of its characteristic features (cp. Abhidharma definitions like AKBh 54,20 f.: *saṃjñā . . . viṣayanimittodgrahaḥ*), or of a formation or application of concepts or *notions* (cp. also Th. STCHERBATSKY, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, London 1923, p. 18 f.). The latter aspect (though not necessarily detached from that of visual apperception or visualizing imagination) is especially obvious in the many cases where the content of *saṃjñā* is concretized by an expression marked by *itī* (in this connection, special mention should be made of the *itī* sentences in the stereotyped description of the three lower States Beyond Visible Matter which are, according to MN III 27 ff., characterized by a special *saṃjñā*; cp. also AN V 63: '*natthi kiñci*' *ti ākīñcaññāyatanaṃ eko saññānāti*), or by an equivalent syntactical element (cp., e.g., MN I 1: *paṭhavim paṭhavito saññānāti*, or, in the same sense, AN V 318: *paṭhavīyaṃ paṭhavī-saññā*). The inadequacy of the rendering "Wahrnehmung" becomes especially manifest in cases where the notion or idea expressed by *saṃjñā* is inadequate or even contrary to reality, e.g. in AN II 52 *anicce niccasaññino*, which means "who have the notion 'permanent' with regard to what is [in reality] impermanent", or in cases where *saṃjñā* clearly involves intentionality, as e.g. in the term *māṭṛsaṃjñā* (Aṣṭaśāstrikā [ed. VAIDYA] p. 14, 15) which means the (deliberate cultivation of the) notion of 'mother' with regard to all women for the sake of spiritual purification. — Attention should also be paid to words closely associated, or even quasi-synonymous, with *saṃjñā/saññā*, as e.g. *smṛti/sati* (e.g. *marāṇasaññā* besides *marāṇassati* [AN I 41 f.]), *manasikāra* (e.g. AN II 7 + 8), *diṭṭhi* (e.g. Sn 847 and 802; AN II 52), *mati* (Udānavarga [ed. BERNHARD] XXIX.3), etc.

52 Cp. esp. AN 9.47 ff.

52a Cp., e.g., MN II 12 f.; DN II 70 f.; MPPUL 1281 f.; HURVITZ (cp. Add.!) 121 ff.

53 Cp., e.g., DN III 265 f. and 290; SN 16.9–11; 28.1–9; AN 9.32 f.; MPPUL p. 1308.

54 The heterogeneity of these two groups and the secondary, artificial character of their combination has been emphasized by HEILER, *Die buddhistische Versenkung*, p. 27 f. This fact seems to suggest that the exposition of Liberation as the result of the successive exercise of the *anupūrvavihāras* is, as a whole, not a *description* but only a *theory* of Liberating Insight and of the process by which it is achieved. — In SN 48.40, by the way, *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* follows the Fourth Dhyāna!

This is, however, definitely the case in another version of the nine Successive States which is rather frequent in the MN and the AN⁵⁵ and which adds, after the Disciple's or monk's attainment of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, the remark that "his Cankers have completely vanished after he has seen by comprehension" (. . . *saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ upasaṃpajja viharati, paññāya c'assa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti*⁵⁶). That at least this version has to be regarded as a description of the Path of Liberation is proved beyond doubt by the fact that even the *Ster.Det.Descr.* – the complete "Disciple's Liberation version"⁵⁷ as well as the incomplete version describing the Buddha's Enlightenment⁵⁸ – was occasionally remodelled in such a way that after the description of the entrance into the four *dhyānas*, which is common to both patterns, the *anupūrvavihāra*-pattern (including the sentence *paññāya c'assa. . .*) is followed. Thus, in these texts, Liberating Insight or Comprehension and the vanishing of the Cankers are not mentioned after the attainment of the Fourth Dhyāna but only after the entrance into *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*.

It is, however, difficult to know what kind of *prajñā* is meant because the text is rather cryptic, not mentioning any object or contents of that *prajñā*⁵⁹.

Perhaps the object was considered to be self-evident, either from the textual context or from the context of situation. As for the textual context, there seem to be only two elements which could be implicitly referred to as the object of *disvā*: either the Cankers (*āsavā*) or *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*. From the point of view of the context of situation (*viz.* Liberating Insight), the four Noble Truths may be added as a third possibility, and this is what DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN assumes⁶⁰. But he also realizes that a clear and analytical comprehension of such a content (the same would be true in the case of the Cankers) can hardly be conceived to take place, as the wording suggests, in *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* as a state of complete cessation of Ideation (*saṃjñā*) including notionally structured consciousness⁶¹. He therefore understands the sentence "*paññāya c'assa. . .*" as referring to a former *prajñā*^{61a}. This is not impossible if the sentence, as is almost certain, was added to the *anupūrvavihāra* list afterwards by people who regarded *prajñā* as a necessary condition for the vanishing of the Cankers, for it is conceivable that they were

55 E.g. MN Nos. 25, 26, 113; AN 9.34 ff. – As far as I can see, this enlarged version is missing in DN and SN (cp. the remark in n. 15!), and seems to be rather rare in the Chinese Āgamas (so far, I have found it only in MĀc Nos. 178 (p. 720 a 23) corresp. to MN No. 25, 97 (582 a 29) corresp. to DN No. 15, and 168 (701 b 12) corresp. to MN No. 120.

56 *parikkhayaṃ agamaṃsu* in AN 9.41. – On p.p.p. + *hoti*: BECHERT, op. cit. (n. 18), 60.

57 AN 10.99.

58 AN 9.41.

59 The construction of the absolutive as referring to a genitive does not preclude the expression of an object of the absolutive: cp. SPEYER, *Sanskrit Syntax*, § 380 (2.2). – As regards the position of *assa*, cp. I. ICKLER, *Untersuchungen zur Wortstellung und Syntax der Chāndogyopaniṣad*, Göttingen 1973, p. 79.

60 *Mus.*, p. 191.

61 See n. 51.

61a *Mus.*, p. 220.

reluctant to split the older formula and insert the sentence in between, e.g. after the Fourth Dhyāna. In fact, in the Kīṭāgirisutta (MN No. 70), the sentence “*paññāya c’assa . . .*” clearly expresses an achievement which is independent of the one expressed in the preceding sentence (viz. that the person in question has attained the “quiet liberations”, i.e. the States or Spheres Beyond Visible Matter)⁶², because this sentence, which precedes “*paññāya c’assa . . .*”, is affirmative in the case of the person who is liberated from both parts (*ubhatobhāga-vimutta*) but negative in the case of the person who is liberated by comprehension [only] (*paññā-vimutta*). Yet, this passage seems to be a rather late systematization, and its testimony should not be overvalued. It can hardly preclude the possibility that, in the case of the enlarged *anupūrvavahāra* formula (i.e. the formula to which the sentence “*paññāya c’assa . . .*” is added and which seems to be comparatively old, too, because it occurs in quite a number of texts, often augmented by various later additions), the *prajñā* that causes the vanishing of the Cankers takes place a f t e r or even i n *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*. The former of these possibilities seems to be excluded by the Anupadasutta (MN No. 111) where the passage is followed by the remark “he then arises from that mystic attainment . . .” (so *tāya samāpattiya . . . vutthāti . . .*), although in this case, once again, we must be cautious because what follows the sentence “*paññāya c’assa . . .*” is definitely a later stratum (cf. ch. L). In any case, if *prajñā* is to take place i n *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, it cannot be of the usual analytical and conceptualized kind, and its object can only be *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* itself, i.e. Nirvāṇa realized in a temporary mystical anticipation. This is also at least possible if *prajñā* is to follow *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, and it seems to be supported by another passage of the Kīṭāgirisutta (MN No. 70) where it is said that “ . . . he both realizes the Highest Truth (which can hardly be anything but Nirvāṇa⁶³) ‘by his body’ and penetrates i n t o i t by Comprehension⁶⁴”.

However that may be, it is certain that some early Buddhists advocated the doctrine that the means, or at least one necessary condition, for attaining Arhatship or the vanishing of all Cankers is the temporary anticipation of the state of Nirvāṇa in this life by means of a personal mystical experience which was thought to be achieved especially by the attainment of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*⁶⁵. A considerable number of sources testify to the fact that (at least some of) the followers of this doctrine recognized (or came to recognize) that *prajñā* was indispensable

62 MN I 477: *ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā te kāyena phassitvā (Nālandā-ed.: phusitvā) viharati, paññāya c’assa disvā āsavā parikkhiṇā honti.*

63 Cp. also the explanation of Ps III 193: *paramasaccam ti . . . nibbānasaccam.*

64 MNI 480: *kāyena c’eva paramasaccam sacchikaroti, paññāya ca naṃ ativijjha passati.*

65 Cp. also the sentence *saññāvedayitanirodham p’āham, bhikkhave, nissāya āsavānam khayam vadāmi* in AN 9.36, Nālandā-ed. IV 61, 10 f. (see ch. K + n. 110!), Vi 781 b 26 f. quotes a passage, resembling MĀc 701 b 17 ff., according to which on account of having attained *nirodhasamāpatti*, one will neither experience any future rebirth [along with the] illness, death and suffering [involved in it] nor produce the causes from which it could originate — a passage which, though, of course, interpreted otherwise by the Vibhāṣā, clearly expresses the view that *nirodhasamāpatti* effectuates Liberation.

for the vanishing of the Cankers, and some sources seem to indicate that *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* itself, or Nirvāṇa, was the content of this *prajñā*. But it is difficult to decide whether this *prajñā* was considered to be, so to speak, a transconceptual gnoseological aspect of the mystic state of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* itself, or to occur after it as its conceptualization.

In any case: the question arises how to explain the fact that, besides the conception of Liberating Insight as a comprehension of the four Noble Truths realized especially in the state of the Fourth Dhyāna, we also find a fundamentally different view according to which Liberating Insight is considered to be, or at least to include as a *conditio sine qua non*, an anticipatory personal experience, or a comprehension based on such an experience, of *Nirvāṇa*. The composite character of the *anupūrvavīhāra* pattern (cp. n. 54) and the fact that the "Disciple's-Liberation version" of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* was occasionally adapted to the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory (see n. 57), may suggest that the latter theory is somewhat later; and it is tempting to assume that it was developed in order to obtain a psychologically plausible relation between the content of Liberating Insight and its effect. Such a relation is in fact achieved: the experience or comprehension of supramundane Nirvāṇa is, naturally, apt to extirpate all Craving for mundane existence. But I am afraid such an explanation is too simple.

Perhaps it is preferable to start from a situation of co-existence of a larger number of spiritual exercises, bearing on Liberation but not yet systematized with regard to both their precise relation to Liberation and their mutual relation^{65a}, and variously taught or recommended – in part, probably, already by the Buddha himself – according to the topic concerned, or the specific spiritual situation of the person(s) addressed. Yet, the urge to systematize these exercises seems to have been felt quite early, and the "Disciple's-Liberation version" of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* is obviously one such early attempt. In this context of systematizing, a key position seems to have been accorded to Liberating Insight (*ājñā/aññā*, etc.), but its content does not seem to have been fixed authoritatively from the outset. One, may be the oldest, attempt was to determine the content of Liberating Insight in analogy to that of Enlightenment, this being considered essentially to comprise the comprehension of the four Noble Truths. The *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory, as a developed theory of Liberating Insight connected with the *anupūrvavīhāra* pattern, may well be a response to the theory set forth in the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, and as such could have been (co-)motivated by the attempt to achieve psychological plausibility, but perhaps also by the account of Enlightenment given in MN No. 26 (I 167: *ajātaṃ . . . anuttaraṃ yogakkhemaṃ nibbānaṃ ajjhagamaṃ*; see end of ch. C and n. 29a) interpreted in a gnoseological sense – especially if this account is really as old as BAREAU (see n. 29) takes it to be –. It is, however, probable that the spiritual exercise of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, or mys-

65a Cp., e.g., the exercise of the four *satipaṭṭhānas* (see L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Die vier Konzentrationen der Aufmerksamkeit, in: Zeitschr. f. Missionswiss. u. Religionswiss. 60/1976, p. 241 ff.).

tical anticipation of the state of final Nirvāṇa, was already in existence before such a theory was formed, whatever may have been the origin and original purpose of such an exercise. It may have been practised as a means in some manner useful for Liberation, e.g. on account of its effect of creating, in the mind of the person reemerging from it, a sense of detachment⁶⁶; but it may also — and perhaps this is more probable — have been cultivated, by Arhats or similar persons, for the sake of anticipating Nirvāṇa in this life⁶⁷ and escaping physical pain.

I.

There are, on the other hand, many passages in the canonical texts in which the other possibility of establishing a psychologically plausible relation between the content and the effect of Liberating Insight is actualized, Liberating Insight being described as the comprehension of or insight into the negative nature of existence or its basic factors (as, e.g., the five Skandhas), especially into Impermanence, Disagreeableness, and Not-being-the-Self⁶⁸. E.g., in MN No. 22 (I 138 f.) it is demonstrated that the five Skandhas are impermanent, disagreeable, and neither the Self nor belonging to oneself, that they have to be seen thus by correct comprehension (*sammappaññāya*), and that he who sees them thus becomes detached from them and attains Liberation⁶⁹. In AN No. 4.41 we are told that the contem-

66 Cp. MN I,302: *saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpattiyaṃ vuṭṭhitassa . . . vivekaninnaṃ cittaṃ hoti*.

67 This would agree with the view of later Theravāda (cp. VisM XXIII.30) and, in principle, also with that of other Abhidharma schools (cp., e.g., AKBh 70,3–5; the Sarvāstivādins, however, make it clear that for them *nirodhasamāpatti* is only [the attainment of] an entity similar to Nirvāṇa [cp. AKBh 363, 14], not an anticipatory experience of Nirvāṇa itself).

68 Cp. *Mus.*, p. 190.

69 Cp. also, besides Vin I 13 f., Suttas like MN Nos. 74, 109, 147 and 148 (ERGARDT, *Faith*, p. 50 ff.); SN Nos. 12.70 (II 124 f.); 18.1–20, 22.12–20, etc.; 23.13–22; 24.71–96; 35.1–6, 28–29, 32 ff., etc.; 44.2. — All these texts (instances of which are most frequent in SN but seem to be missing in DN and AN; cp. n. 15!) end in the formula “*evam passam . . . ariyasāvako . . . nibbindati, nibbindaṃ virajjati, virāgā vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti; ‘khīṇā jāti. . . ?’ ti pajānāti*”. The last two sentences thus agree with the end of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* It is, however, evident that in the present context the sentence *vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti* cannot be construed because in the preceding sentence there is no neuter substantive to which *vimuttam* could refer, whereas in the *Ster.Det.Descr.* (cp. n. 20) it presents no difficulty because it can easily be understood as referring to *citta*, occurring, in the preceding sentence, as the subject of *vimuccati* (see n. 20). In fact, in some of the above-mentioned texts the released person is afterwards referred to by the Bahuvrīhi *vimuttacitta* (I 500; I 140, after what seems to be an insertion); and in the Vinaya (I 13; cp. also I 35) — the phraseology of which recurs also in some of the above-mentioned Suttas, e.g. MN Nos. 74, 109, 147, and 148; SN Nos. 35.74–75 — the result of the discourse is that the mind (*cittāni*) of auditors are freed from all Cankers (*āśava*). Thus, it seems that the use of the sentence *vimuttasmiṃ vimuttam iti ñāṇaṃ hoti* after the formula *nibbindaṃ virajjati virāgā vimuccati* is secondary, which would mean that the assumption, probable from the doctrinal point of view, that

plation of the arising and disappearance (*udayabbaya*) of the five Skandhas is conducive to the vanishing of the Cankers⁷⁰, and according to SN 22.95 what effects

the texts in question are posterior to the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, is corroborated by textual history too. Yet the problem is more complex because there is, in both contexts (cp. ERGARDT, *Faith*, p. 48), a v.l. *vimuttasmiṃ vimutt' amhi-* (or *-mhi*) *ti nānaṃ hoti*. However, it is not probable that this reading is the original one. For if it were the original reading in the context of the formula *nibbindaṃ virajjati* . . . , it is hardly conceivable that it was changed to the reading . . . *vimuttam iti* so difficult to construe in that context. But could the change have originated in the *Ster.Det.Descr.*? Yet why should a reading *vimutt' amhiti*, if it had really been there first, have been changed to *vimuttam iti*? Hardly because the reading *vimutt' amhīti* implies a shift with regard to the noun referred to (for at least *vimutt[o]* can no longer refer to *citta* but only to the released person), for if such a shift was felt to be awkward (as it may, in fact, be felt by us), why wasn't it felt like that by the (Mūla-?) Sarvāstivādins who also read *vimukto 'smīti* (AKVy 654,24 f. and 273,22 f.; cp. also C. TRIPATHI, Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasamyukta [Berlin 1962], Sūtra 7.14; but cp. also MSV II, 184,15 where we find *vimuktam eva!*)? The same question would apply also to the argument that the wording *vimutt' amhīti* might have been altered because the use of the first person was felt to imply the wrong conception of an *ātman* and thus inappropriate in the case of an Arhat. Besides, the "Enlightenment version" of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* abounds in pronouns and verb forms of the 1st person sg.; cp. also *akuppaṃ me vimutti* in the "Arhat formula" of MN I 167 and the DhCPS. Thus, it seems more reasonable to start from the reading *vimuttam iti* in the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, which is, in that passage, completely satisfactory both syntactically and logically, and would seem to be fairly old on account of its archaic sandhi (*-tam iti* instead of *-taṃ ti*; but cp. also PISCHEL, Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen, § 349). I cannot, it is true, quite exclude the possibility that the reading *vimutt' amhi* may have arisen in the context of the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, perhaps because the transmitters, like some modern translators (see, e.g., ERGARDT, *Faith*, p. 48), had difficulties with the syntactical construction of the sentence; and if the reading had come up very early, the connection of the phrase "*vimuttasmiṃ* . . ." with the formula "*nibbindaṃ virajjati*" would have been easier. But it would then seem difficult to explain that in the Pali tradition the reading *vimuttam iti* seems to prevail even in that context where it can hardly be understood. Therefore, it is perhaps preferable to assume that the reading *vimutt' amhi* originated in the context of the formula *nibbindaṃ virajjati* . . . just because the original wording *vimuttam iti*, mechanically taken over from the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, was unintelligible or at least syntactically awkward in a context in which the subject of the preceding *vimuccati* clearly is *ariyasāvako*. By reading *vimutt' amhi*, this expression too could be referred to that person. Thus, a more coherent construction was achieved. Yet, the word *vimuttasmiṃ* still makes difficulties. An absolute locative, quite natural in the context of the *Ster.Det.Descr.* where it refers to the object cognized and thus is close to a *viśayasaptamī*, would seem awkward in the context of the formula *nibbindaṃ virajjati* . . . where it must refer to the person in whom cognition arises (in other words: it would be awkward to refer to the logical subject of that cognition by a syntactical element expressive of a concomitant circumstance). In such a case the genitive would be more natural (cp., e.g., MN I 167: *nānaṃ ca pana me . . . udapādi*; VON HINÜBER, *Kasussyntax*, §§ 238 f.). In fact, the (Mūla-?) Sarvāstivāda version of our sentence, which seems to have adopted the reading *vimukto 'smīti* in both contexts (see above), has replaced the locative by a genitive (*vimuktasya*).

70 Cp. also passages like Vin I, 11 ff. or 15 ff., where, however, the realization that everything that originates is subject to destruction (*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhammaṃ*) only characterizes the attainment of the Pure Eye (i.e. Insight) with

detachment and liberation is the realization of the Skandhas as empty (*rittaka*), vain (*tucchaka*) and without any pith or substance (*asāraka*).

It is striking that many (though not all) of these passages do not indicate that meditative concentration is required, that in some of them it — or at least the entrance into the fourth, or even any, *dhyāna* — seems even to be precluded by the context⁷¹. In AN No. 4.41, e.g., the practice of the *dhyānas* is said to be conducive to a state of comfort in this life (*ditṭhadhamma-sukhavihāra*) only. In the Vinaya, both Insight and Liberation⁷² seem to be effected essentially by listening to the preaching of the Doctrine⁷³.

According to DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN⁷⁴, the reason that some texts dispense with meditative concentration, or at least the *dhyānas*, as a prerequisite to Liberating Insight was that, as the *dhyānas*, at least the fourth and especially the supranormal faculties it entailed⁷⁵, were accessible only to a minority of monks, their

regard to the Doctrine (or: to [the true nature of] dharmas) (*virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhamma-cakkhum*), but does not yet mean Liberation of the mind from all Cankers (*āsava*) which takes place only later, esp. after further instruction.

71 Cp. *Mus.*, p. 201 ff.

72 See n. 70.

73 In AN No. 5.26, however, this seems to have been reinterpreted in the sense that *samādhi* has to follow upon instruction.

74 *Mus.*, p. 206.

75 In the *Ster.Det.Descri.*, the *āsavaṇaṃ khayañāna* which includes the insight into the four Noble Truths is usually preceded by two other supranormal cognitions, viz. the remembrance of one's own former lives (*pubbenivāsānussatiñāna*) and the observation of the dying and being reborn [of other living beings] (*cutūpapātāñāna*) (cp. ns. 18 and 35). Yet, the Pāli canon contains at least one complete version, viz. MN No. 112 (III 33 ff.) and two incomplete versions of the *Ster.Det.Descri.*, viz. AN Nos. 5.75 and 76 (III 92 f. and 99 f.; see also Puggalapaññatti, p. 68), in which the paragraphs on these two supranormal cognitions are missing. In the Madhyamāgama (T 26), this version even seems to prevail: cp., e.g., MĀc Nos. 19 (444 c 6 ff.), 102 (589 c 14 ff. [cp. BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 76]), 146 (658 a 7 ff.), 182 (725 b 24 ff.), 187 (734 a 8 ff.), 203 (775 a 25 ff.), and 204 (778 b 14 ff.), against Nos. 157 (679 c 27 ff.) and 194 (748 a 13 ff.) which include *pūrvanivāsānussmṛti*- and *cyutyupapāḍajñāna*. It might appear tempting to consider the shorter version to be a later abbreviation due to representatives of the “rationalist” current. But the fact that the version without *pūrvanivāsānussmṛti*- and *cyutyupapāḍajñāna* does not seem to be confined to the “Disciple's-Liberation pattern” of the *Ster.Det.Descri.* but seems to occur also in the context of the “Enlightenment pattern” (MĀc No. 102, according to BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 76, and Pali [MN No. 19], but Chinese switches over from “I” to “he”, perhaps misled by a wording like Pali *so . . . abhininnāmesim*) does not seem to favour such an assumption (though the possibility that even the description of Enlightenment was, secondarily, adapted to a “rationalist” version of the “Disciple's-Liberation version” of the *Ster.Det.Descri.* can perhaps not be excluded for certain; cp. also Suttas like SN No. 35.13 and 14). Moreover, BAREAU (*Recherches*, pp. 81 ff. and 88 ff.) has tried to prove that the paragraphs on *pūrvanivāsānussmṛti*- and *cyutyupapāḍajñāna* are later additions, and some of his arguments, though not all, seem to have weight, esp. his drawing attention to the fact that each supranormal cognition is introduced by the same phrase, viz. *so evaṃ samāhite citte . . .*, which, however, fits in satisfactorily only in —

indispensability would have precluded the majority from attaining Liberation. Yet, another, may be complementary, reason seems to be conceivable: the dissociation of Liberating Insight from the Fourth Dhyāna, and subsequently from the *dhyānas* in general, can, perhaps, also be regarded as the consequence of an awareness of the difference of situation between the Buddha's Enlightenment and the Disciples' Liberating Insight; Enlightenment as a first discovery, or at least experiential confirmation, of the soteriologically relevant truths may require the Fourth Dhyāna frequently associated with supranormal faculties; but in the case of the Liberating Insight of Disciples, especially if its content was narrowed down to the psychologically most relevant aspect of the negative nature of mundane existence (which, especially if taught or demonstrated by a teacher, is easily discerned or intellectually verified), such supranormal mental faculties, as well as the extraordinary level of meditative absorption presupposed for their attainment, could easily come to be regarded as unnecessary.

In this connection it may be worth noting that the contemplation of the negative nature of mundane existence or its factors sometimes looks more like a preparatory exercise furthering, but not immediately effecting, detachment or Liberation⁷⁶. Thus, the hypothesis, framed with regard to the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory (see ch. H, end), – viz. that a certain spiritual exercise, but one of an already existing stock of partly parallel, partly complementary exercises bearing on Liberation though not yet systematized, was later accorded the position of Liberating Insight proper, i.e. of the central element in the process of Liberation – would seem to hold good in the case of the “negative-intellectual” theory of Liberation, too; and, once again, this development to a central position may well have been (co-)motivated by the wish to achieve psychological plausibility.

mediately after the description of the *dhyānas*. In fact, in the version of the DN (e.g. I 76 ff.) further supranormal faculties have been inserted before the *pubbenivāsānussatiñāna* by means of the same repetitive structure. The doctrinal divergencies between the first two and the third supranormal cognitions (BAREAU, *Recherches*, p. 90; cp. also n. 35 of this paper) may only prove that the first two paragraphs are heterogeneous, not that they have been added later, but the latter fact, too, seems to be indicated by a formal inconsistency in the “Enlightenment pattern” (which therefore may perhaps be regarded as the older pattern?) where we find aorists throughout, including the description of *āsavānaṃ khayāñāna* (so . . . *abbhaññasim*, *tassa me . . . vimuccittha*, so . . . *ahosiṃ*), whereas in the case of the description of the first two supranormal cognitions, curiously enough, the present tense is used (so . . . *anussarāmi*, so . . . *passāmi . . . pajānāmi*), a fact substantially confirmed by the Mahāvastu (II 283 ff.). It seems that the original version had used aorists throughout. Therefore, it appears that the version omitting the first two supranormal cognitions is older than the one that contains them, this version, in its turn, being older than that of the DN. Yet obviously none of the later versions was able to completely supersede the former, and it may well be that later on representatives of the “rationalist” current favoured the short version which lacked the paragraphs on *pūrvanivāsānussmṛti*- and *cyutyupapādajñāna*, just as the longest version seems to have been favoured by the “Dīrghabhānakas”.

76 Cp., e.g., SN IV 4–6 (. . . *nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti*); 17–19 (*bhaddo dukkhakkhayāya*); cp. also MN No. 146.

J.

1.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN has drawn attention to a canonical text⁷⁷ which expressly testifies to the existence of an open antagonism between the followers of the "positive-mystical" current and those of the "negative-intellectual" one, but which at the same time enjoins reconciliation. Actually, there are a few Suttas which seem to make sense only if understood as attempts to harmonize the two traditions. In some cases, however, this harmonization shows features of what P. HACKER⁷⁸ has called "inclusivism", i.e. a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the other doctrine or its propounders. This "inclusivist" tendency is especially conspicuous in a few texts belonging to the "negative-intellectual" current (see esp. chs. J.3, L, and M).

2.

The first text I should like to discuss in this connection is the description of Liberating Insight at the end of the *Mahāmālunkyaśutta* (MN No. 64)⁷⁹. This description is based on the *anupūrvavāhāra* pattern, but it does not accept *saṃjñāvedayitaṇirodha* as a basis of Liberating Insight. Actually, *saṃjñāvedayitaṇirodha* is not free from a certain ambivalence, sometimes appearing as a cataleptic state similar to death⁸⁰ and distinguished from it merely by the continuance of unconscious factors such as vital power, body heat, and sense-faculties, but without any bodily, verbal or mental activity⁸¹. In any case, it is, by definition, devoid of ideation (*saṃjñā*), i.e. consciousness implying formation of notions⁸², from which *prajñā*, as it is usually understood in the early texts, does not seem to be easily detachable⁸³. In fact, a text closely parallel to the *Mahāmālunkyaśutta*⁸⁴

77 AN No. 6.46 (III 355 f.) discussed in *Mus.* p. 191 f.

78 See HACKER, *Kl.Schr.*, index, s. v. "Inklusivismus".

79 MN I 435 f.; the Chinese version is MĀc No. 205 (esp. p. 779 c 16 ff.). Cp. also AKVY 273,10 ff. (which, however, does not seem to be a Skt. equivalent of the final portion of MN No. 64 but rather looks like an expanded version of a text like AN Nos. 4.123–124), and TSī 338 c 23–27 (abbreviated).

80 MN I 333.

81 MN I 296 = SN IV 294.

82 See n. 51.

83 Cp. also JOHANSSON, op. cit. [see n. 51], p. 95.

84 AN 9.36 (see ch. K).

explicitly states that “attainment [to Liberating] Insight⁸⁵ [is only possible] so far as one dwells in meditative absorption involving ideation” (*yāvatā saññāsamāpatti tāvata aññāpaṭivedho*)⁸⁶. Due to this stipulation, the State of Neither-[ideational]-Consciousness-nor-Non-consciousness (*naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*) is also excluded⁸⁷. Thus, the highest remaining stage is the State of Nothingness (*ākīncanyāyatana*) which, however, nowhere has any special relation to Liberating Insight. The only remaining stage which could have claimed an exceptional position would have been the Fourth Dhyāna, but both in the “negative-intellectualist” current and in the “positive-mystical” one (elements of both of which our text tries to integrate) the Fourth Dhyāna had never occupied such a position. Thus it becomes intelligible that our text states that Liberating Insight effecting the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsrava*) – or at least of the Fetters Conducive to Lower [Forms of Existence] (*orambhāgiya-saṃyojana*)⁸⁸ – can be produced in any of the remaining states of meditative concentration, i.e. in all the four *dhyānas* and the first three States Beyond Visible Matter⁸⁹. It is important to note that in this text Liberating Insight though dissociated from *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* and no longer exclusively

85 Or “penetration [into Truth by means of Liberating] Insight”? Acc. to PTC (pt. III.2, pp. 93 f.), the verb *paṭivijjhati* may be used both with an accusative (e.g. *ariyasaccāni, santaṃ padam*) and with an instrumental (e.g. *ñāṇena, paññāya!*) According to the Niddesa, *ājānāmi* and *paṭivijjhati* may be used as quasi-synonyms, which would suggest, as a third though not very probable possibility, that one could take *aññāpaṭivedha* as “penetration [which is Liberating] Insight”. – The CPD, following Mp, gives the rendering “attainment to Arhatship”; but although implying Arhatship, *aññā*, except for later texts, does not seem to designate Arhatship.

86 AN IV 426; cp. also *Mus.*, p. 204, n. 1. A Sanskrit version of the sentence is transmitted in AS 69,15 f. (= ASBh 81,21).

87 In spite of the fact that in a few texts the expression *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana saññā* is used (see n. 130). There are, in fact, texts which include the *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* among the states in which Liberating Insight is attainable: cp., e.g., the Sūtra quoted AKVy 273,10 ff., esp. 275,26 f. (see n. 79); see also n. 95 and ch. K + n. 114.

88 The Chinese version (see n. 79), although admitting the possibility of not succeeding in destroying all Cankers (see n. 89), does not mention the alternative of getting rid of the *orambhāgiyasamyojanas* only (and thereby becoming an *opapātika*, i.e. *anāgāmin*), but the same possibility is also found in MN No. 52 (see ch. J. 3), and there it is confirmed by the Chinese versions (viz. MĀc No. 217 and T 92); it is also confirmed by AN 9.36 and further elaborated by the Sūtra quoted in AKVy 273,10 ff. On the other hand, the introductory and concluding element of the Pali version of the final portion of the Mahāmālunkya-sutta (viz. “*katamo c, Ānanda, maggo . . . pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ pahānāya?*” and “*ayaṃ pi kho, Ānanda, maggo . . . pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ pahānāya*”) is not confirmed by any of these versions and in fact does not appear to be adequate to the context because it neglects the primary result, viz. the attainment of complete vanishing of all Cankers.

89 According to the Chinese version, an attempt at practising Liberating Insight at a higher stage of meditative concentration is only made if by its practice at the lower stage one did not succeed in effectuating the vanishing of the *āśravas*. I am not sure whether such a gradation is necessarily expressed by the particle *puna ca param* (or *puna c'aparam*, cp. PTSD s.v. *puna*, and Buddh. Skt. *punar aparam*) by means of which the different stages – in ascending order, it is true – are joined together in the Pali version.

related to the Fourth Dhyāna but attainable in lower states as well, is nevertheless understood to be confined to states of *m e d i t a t i v e c o n c e n t r a t i o n*. Thus, the text, through having an intellectualist tendency, is by no means *s t r i c t l y* intellectualist.

3.

As regards its object or *c o n t e n t*, Liberating Insight starts with an observation or contemplation (*samanupassati*)⁹⁰, viz. of all material and mental factors occurring in the respective stage of meditation, as impermanent (*aniccato*), disagreeable (*dukkhato*), [comparable to ^{90a} a] disease, etc., empty (*suññato*) and not-the-self (*anattato*)⁹¹. In the Chinese version⁹², what is contemplated or observed is simply the coming forth and passing away (*udayavyaya*), i.e. the impermanence, of those factors, and the intellectual operation leading to the vanishing of the *āsravas* is *c o m p l e t e* with this realization of the negative nature of mundane existence (as represented by these factors)⁹³, thus wholly following the “negative-intellectualist” line (cp. ch. I). In this regard, the Chinese version is conceived along the same lines as the Aṭṭhakanāgarasutta (MN No. 52)⁹⁴; for in this latter the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsava*), or at least of the Fetters conducive to lower forms of existence (*orambhāgiya-saṃyojana*), is, as in the Mahāmālūṅkyasutta, said to take place in the First Dhyāna or any of the following states up to the Sphere of Nothingness⁹⁵, and the means by which this is brought about is, as in the Chinese version of the Mahāmālūṅkyasutta, the contemplation (*paṭisaṅcikkhati*) of the

90 *anupassati* (lit. perhaps “nachblicken”, “mit dem Blick folgen”) seems to comprise the meaning both of “to observe”, “to notice [an event, or esp. a series of events, (immediately) after its, or their, occurrence]” (cp., e.g., the *satipaṭṭhāna*-formula *kāye kāyānupassī viharati*, etc.) and of “to contemplate [something deliberately, afterwards or successively, under a certain aspect]” (cp., e.g., n. 120; for both aspects, cp. also CPD s.v.). Sometimes, as in the present passage, it is difficult to draw the borderline between the two aspects because, of course, a phenomenon may be *n o t i c e d* to be impermanent as well as (deliberately) *c o n t e m p l a t e d* as impermanent. Yet, in instances like *rogato samanupassati*, the aspect of *c o n t e m p l a t i o n* seems to be predominant because an element of comparison, of deliberate interpretation, is included. – The prefix *sam-* in *samanupassati*, at least in many cases, appears to express *c o m p l e t e n e s* or *c o r r e c t n e s s*.

90a Thus also TSi 338c 25f.

91 Same series also in AN IV 422 f. (see ch. K), AN II 128 and 130, and MN I 500 (different context). Cp. also AKVy 273,13 ff. and TSi 338c 25 f.

92 MĀ_C p. 779 c 19 f., etc.

93 The latter statement is also true of the Sutta quoted in TSi 338 c 23–27.

94 MN I 350 ff. = AN V 343 ff.; there are two Chinese versions, viz. MĀ_C No. 217 and T 92.

95 In the Chinese versions (MĀ_C p. 802 b 27; T 92, p. 916c 8), *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* is added (but *n o t* *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*; but cp. ch. M + n. 144). Moreover, after the Fourth Dhyāna, the four Boundless [States] (viz. *mettā*, etc.), are inserted in all versions.

respective states as produced on purpose (*abhisāṅkhatam abhisāñcetitam*) and therefore impermanent (*anicca*) and subject to destruction (*nirodhadhamma*)⁹⁶.

4.

In the Pāli version⁹⁷ of the Mahāmālunkyasutta, however, the intellectual operation conducive to the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsava*) includes a second step which gives the impression of another integration of an important element of the "positive-mystical" tradition: after having contemplated the negative nature of the above mentioned factors and turned one's mind away from them, one directs the mind towards the Sphere or State Beyond the Reach of Death (*amatā dhātu*), i.e. Nirvāṇa, which is recognized as peaceful (*santa*) and excellent (*pañīta*)⁹⁸. In this way, the intellectual process effectuating the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsava*) implies two phases: not only the realization of the negative nature of mundane existence, which may be understood as corresponding, in essence, to the comprehension of the Truth of Suffering (*dukkhasatya*), but also a realization of the positive nature of the supramundane state of Nirvāṇa which is closely related to the Noble Truth of Cessation (*nirodhasatya*), as is shown by the fact that among the synonyms of Nirvāṇa used in our text⁹⁹ we find, besides *nirodha* itself, expressions like "vanishing of Craving" (*taṇhakkhaya*) which evoke the old stereotyped definition of the Truth of Cessation, although it must be borne in mind that what is brought home in this insight is not, as in the old definition of *nirodhasatya*, the fact that the cessation of Craving effectuates the cessation of Suffering, but rather the fact that the cessation of Craving, and still more of course the cessation of Suffering, is a peaceful and desirable state. Yet the emphasis, palpable in the synonyms used, on the aspect of the vanishing of Craving shows that, in our text, the liberating realization of Nirvāṇa does not seem to be, as it obviously is the case in the "saṃjñāvedayitānirodha-Liberation", a mystico-existential experience temporarily anticipating, in this life, the final cessation of Suffering, but an essentially intellectual, though meditative, comprehension of the merits mainly of the spiritual state of the cessation of craving, thus not bound to the attain-

96 The Chinese versions (MA_C p. 802 b 8 f., etc.; T 92, p. 916 b 18, etc.) only speak of observation or noticing of the [respective] factors as such (i.e. as they [actually] are) (**dharmaṣu dharmānupāśyanā*).

97 Confirmed not only by AN 9.36 (see ch. K) but also by the Sūtra quoted in AKVy 273,10 ff. and, indirectly, by Y_m fol. 81 a 5 f. (= Y_C 343 a 13 ff.) which seems to allude to a similar version of a Sūtra like MN No. 64 or AN 9.36 (*iha bhikṣuḥ prathamam dhyānaṃ upasāmpadya viharati / ... cakṣurādīni dukkhato manasikaroti ... rogādito vā / ... evaṃ yāva dākiñcanyāyatānā t / ... sarvanimittānāṃ amanasikārāt nirodhaṃ śāntato manasikaroti / ...*).

98 Skt. in AKVy 273, 16 ff.

99 But not confined to it: see ch. J. 5; cp. also H. W. SCHUMANN, Bedeutung und Bedeutungsentwicklung des Terminus Saṃkhāra im frühen Buddhismus, Bonn 1957 (Diss.), p. 75.

ment of a transcendent sphere like *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* but on the contrary attainable only in a state of meditation in which ideation (*saṃjñā*) including notionally structured consciousness is present in a clear form.

5.

It should be added that in a few Suttas of the *Āṅguttaranikāya*¹⁰⁰ we meet with a description of a type of meditative concentration in which one does not ideate (i.e. apprehend and determine notionally) earth, water, etc. (i.e. visible matter) as earth, water, etc., nor the Sphere of Infinity of Space, etc. (i.e. the four Spheres Beyond Visible Matter), as the Sphere of Infinity of Space, etc., nor this world as this world nor the yonder world as the yonder world¹⁰¹, and yet there is ideative consciousness, viz. in the form “this is peaceful, this is excellent, viz. the calming down of all intentions (*sabbasaṅkhārūpasama*), the abandonment of all attachment (*sabbūpadhipaṭinissagga*), the vanishing of Craving (*taṇhakkhaya*), [its] fading away (*virāga*), cessation (*nirodha*), extinction (*nibbāna*)”¹⁰². This is exactly the formula of the *Mahāmāluṅkyasutta*. Though it is not expressly stated in any of the Suttas just referred to that this type of meditative concentration is Liberating Insight, it can hardly be anything else, and there is in fact another Sutta¹⁰³ which

100 AN 10,6 u. 7 (V 7 ff.); 11.7 (V 318 f.); 11.8 (V 321 f.; *manasikaroti* instead of *-saññi hoti!*); 11.19–22 (V 353 ff.); cp. also texts like AN 11.9 (V 323 ff.), 9.37 (IV 426 ff.), MN No. 1 (I 1 ff.), Sn 874 and Ud VIII.1, a further investigation of which might be fruitful for the present context. Cp. moreover SĀ_C No. 559 (p. 146 b 22 ff., quoted in part in Y_m 81 a 4 and seemingly a version, though largely divergent, of AN 9.37) where it is said that a monk may not individually apperceive, or be conscious of (*na pratisaṃvedayate*), ordinary entities (viz. the 12 *āyatana*s) even when he is in a state of ideative consciousness (*saṃjñin*), viz. in the four *dhyāna*s or in the first three Stages Beyond Visible Matter, still less so in a state where ideative consciousness is lacking (*prāg evāsaṃjñi*), viz. in *animittaś cetaḥsamādhiḥ*. As regards the interpretation of the latter, the explanation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (Y_m 81 a 6) indicates two possibilities: e i t h e r it is the contemplation or comprehension of Cessation (i.e. of *Nirvāṇa*) as peaceful which, though distinct (i.e. ideative) consciousness, is yet called non-ideation because it is devoid of [the appearance of] all mundane characteristics (*yā sarvanimittāpagatā saṃjñā saivātra asaṃjñā abhipretā*); o r it refers to *nirodhasamāpatti* which means complete non-occurrence of any ideation. The latter explanation seems to be the more natural one (cp. also the function of *animitto cetosamādhi* in MN No. 121 [see ch. M]). If this is correct, the *Sūtra*, which says that *animittaś cetaḥsamādhiḥ* results in Liberating Insight (*ājñā*, cp. AN IV 428), would belong to, or at least be closely related to, the “*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory” and at the same time testify to a close relationship between the group of *Sūtras* pointed out in the beginning of this note and the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* tradition (cp. also ch. J. 6).

101 i. e. one does not ideate anything mundane.

102 Acc. to AN 10.7, this ideation has the form of “*Nirvāṇa* is the Cessation of becoming (i. e. mundane existences) (*bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ*)”.

103 AN 3.32 (I 132 f.)

expressly states that the attainment of a meditative concentration which comprehends Nirvāṇa as peaceful and excellent (same formula as before!) entails the cessation of [all] propensities to the notion of ego, to the notion of mine, and to conceit (or: [false] conception(s)) (*ahaṃkāramamimkāramānānusayā*)¹⁰⁴. Therefore, these Suttas seem to testify to a view which conceived Liberating Insight as consisting solely in a meditative-intellectual (or -ideational) comprehension of Nirvāṇa, just as in the second step of the Mahāmāluṅkyasutta, but without any mention being made of a preceding contemplation of the negative nature of (factors of) mundane existence. There is no mention of a special state of meditation (as e.g. the Fourth Dhyāna) in which this Insight may take place, but we may exclude *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and especially *saṃjñāvedayitānirodha* because they lack clear ideative consciousness (*saṃjñā*).

6.

It is difficult to allot this theory of Liberating Insight as consisting only in an intellectual though meditative realization of Nirvāṇa, to any of the two currents discussed in ch.s H and I, because it lies just in between: it appears “intellectual” (though not opposed to meditative concentration) in f o r m, but corresponds to the mystical current as regards its c o n t e n t (viz. Nirvāṇa only)¹⁰⁵. Perhaps – though for want of conclusive evidence other possibilities are not ruled out – it is most easily understood as an attempt of the mystical current at adapting its fundamental position, viz. that Liberating Insight is a *prajñā* having Nirvāṇa for its content (ch. H), to the view that *prajñā* is not possible without *saṃjñā* (cp. ch. J.2 + ns. 83 and 86) and therefore not realizable in *saṃjñāvedayitānirodha*^{105a}. If this is true, it probably antedates the Pali version of the Mahāmāluṅkyasutta, by which it would, then, have been taken over. As for the Chinese versions of the Mahāmāluṅkyasutta and the Aṭṭhakanāgarasutta, their affiliation to the “negative-intellectualist” current appears certain, and the Pali version of the Mahāmāluṅkyasutta, if it could in fact be regarded as a later enlargement of the purely negativist version^{105b},

104 My translation of this compound (which also occurs without the last member *anusaya-*, cp. CPD s.v. *ahaṃkāra*) is tentative, the expression needing further investigation. The Skt. equivalent is *ahaṃkāramamakārasmimānābhiniveśānuśayāḥ*, cp. AKBh 142,10 and SWTF s.v. *anuśaya*. Cp. also Y_C 626 b 4 f.

105 It should be noted that this theory appears to be closest of all to that of later Theravāda (see ch. N. 2).

105a Cp. also n. 100 (end)!

105b I must, however, admit that I do not, so far, see any conclusive evidence for excluding the opposite possibility, viz. that the Pali version (and the parallel texts supporting it, cp. n. 97) is earlier and that the contemplation of Nirvāṇa was omitted only later by followers of a stricter negativist line. In the latter case, it would appear more difficult to decide to which of the two currents, if to any at all, the creator(s) of this truly synthetic view may have belonged.

is best taken to be a further integration, by followers of the negative-intellectualist line, of an element of the positive-mystical tradition which, however, probably had already been adapted to the “intellectualist” tradition in form (see above). Yet the doctrine set forth in the Pali version of the Mahāmālunkyasutta appears as a well-balanced synthesis which might also be due to a neutral group or even to followers of the “positive-mystical” current if the texts discussed in ch. J. 5 belong to this latter current.

K.

The same doctrine as in the (final portion of the) Mahāmālunkyasutta is propounded in AN 9.36 (Jhānasutta)¹⁰⁶. The wording of the central portion of this Sutta is largely identical with that of the Mahāmālunkyasutta (ch. J. 2–4), except that each paragraph is enlarged by a simile. Moreover, it is in the end of the central portion of this Sutta that the principle is expressly stated that penetration into Liberating Insight (*ājñā/aññā*) is only possible so far as one dwells in meditative absorption involving ideation (*saṃjñā*)¹⁰⁷. However, this central portion of the text is framed by a short introductory and a short concluding portion, the first of which at least seems to stand contrary to the central portion¹⁰⁸. For in the introductory portion it is stated that the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsava*) may be achieved not only on the basis of (*nissāya*)¹⁰⁹ the four *dhyānas* or the first three States Beyond Visible Matter but also on the basis of *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*¹¹⁰, i.e. also in those two states of the *anupūrvavihāra* pattern which lack [clear] ideation. In the final section, the Sutta seems to declare that as regards [the vanishing of the Cankers on the basis of (??)] these two states lacking [clear] *saṃjñā*, these¹¹¹ [states, and the way in which they can be the basis of the

106 AN IV 422 ff.; no Chinese parallel, acc. to Akanuma. Yet, an equivalent of the sentence *yāvatā saññāsamāpatti tāvatā aññāpaṭivedho*, which, at least in the Pali canon, seems to occur only in AN 9.36, is quoted also in Sanskrit sources (see n. 86; cp. also T 1602, p. 576 c 11 f.).

107 See ch. J. 2 (+ n. 86).

108 cp. *Mus.*, p. 200, n. 1.

109 At least in the case of the four *dhyānas* and the first three States Beyond Visible Matter, the central portion of the Sutta suggests that *nissāya* is meant to imply entrance into the respective state of meditative concentration, and there does not seem to be any clue for maintaining, as regards the present Sutta, a different use in the case of *nevasaññānāsāññāyatana* and *saññāvedayitanirodha* (as might be suggested by texts like MN No. 111 [see ch. L]).

110 The last possibility is not mentioned in some editions, but considering the concluding portion of the Sutta this may be a later omission, perhaps due to doctrinal reasons (on the — exceptional — possibility of *vipassanā* on the basis of *nevasaññānāsāññāyatana*, cp. VisM X. 53 and Ps IV 90, 18 ff.).

111 I do not understand *ete* (Mp IV 198,3: = *etāni*!).

vanishing of the Cankers, are difficult to explain and (??)] should be told by those monks who are skilful in practising these states¹¹², after they have actually entered into and reemerged from them. If this is correct¹¹³, the final portion would imply that the vanishing of the Cankers (i.e. Arhatship) may somehow be achieved also on the basis of *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and *samjñāvedayitanirodha*, although not by means of what can be called Insight (*āñā*) because [clear] ideation, obviously considered to be implied in Insight, is missing in these states. This means that the contradiction that might seem to exist, at first sight, between the introductory and the central portion, is, at least verbally, solved by the concluding portion.

The Jhānasutta is obviously an attempt at a further integration of the "negative-intellectualist" and the "positive-mystical" tradition, on the basis of the synthesis that had already been achieved in the Pali version of the Mahāmālunkyasutta, by extending the system of that text, through *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*¹¹⁴, up to *samjñāvedayitanirodha*. It is, however, once again difficult to decide whether this attempt was carried out by followers of the "negativist" current or by followers of the "positive-mystical" one. The latter possibility is perhaps slightly supported by the fact that the text is transmitted within a section of the Aṅguttaranikāya (9.31–61) which almost exclusively contains materials clearly belonging to the „positive-mystical" current. In this case, however, it seems to follow from the concluding portion of the Jhānasutta that the "author" of this text had, himself, no personal practical experience in the states of meditative absorption beyond ideational consciousness, especially in *samjñāvedayitanirodha* as effecting Liberation. Yet he may have felt the need to keep up, at least verbally and as one possibility among others, his tradition of Liberation by the attainment of *samjñāvedayitanirodha*, even though he did not see how it could work.

L.

There are two more Sūtras which I should like to mention in the context of reinterpretative or "inclusivistic" attempts. One is the Anupadasutta (MN No. 111)¹¹⁵. In contrast to the Mahāmālunkyasutta (ch. J. 2) and to the Aṭṭhakanāgarasutta (ch. J. 3), it contains the complete stereotyped description of the "*sam-*

112 Lit.: "who are skilled in attaining [these states] and skilled in reemerging from the attainment".

113 Unfortunately, the textual transmission of the passage seems to be rather unreliable (many variant readings in the Nālandā-ed.!).

114 *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* may have been included only in order to preserve uniformness of structure which consists, in the central portion, in a continuous succession of stages without a gap, and moreover because, if even *saññāvedayitanirodha* which is totally devoid of *saññā* is suitable as a basis of Liberation, *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* which still contains some form of *saññā* (cp. n. 130) is still more so. But cp. also the passages quoted in n. 87 and 95 where *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* is included among the possible bases of Liberation but not so *samjñāvedayitanirodha*.

115 MN III 25 ff; no Chinese parallel, acc. to Akanuma.

jñāvedayitanirodha-Liberation process", i. e. the whole *anupūrvavihāra* pattern followed by the sentence "*paññāya c'assa . . .*" (cp. ch. H). Like the *Aṭṭhakanāga-sutta* and the Chinese version of the *Mahāmālunkya-sutta* (ch. J. 3), the *Anupada-sutta*, too, inserts, after each of the paragraphs of this description, a largely stereotyped supplementary passage which amounts to a complete reinterpretation according to the principle of detachment through realization of the negative nature of the mundane states of existence, obviously with the intention of vindicating the old formula for the "negativist" tradition. According to these inserted interpretative passages, in each stage of meditative concentration all the mental factors occurring in that stage¹¹⁶ are "fixed immediately upon [their appearance]" (*anupada-vavatthitā*)^{116a}, [and] they are known, i. e. consciously noticed, when originating, being present, and disappearing¹¹⁷. This entails the comprehension that these factors in fact arise after not having existed before, and that after having existed they disappear again¹¹⁸ (i.e. that experience shows or confirms their impermanence). This insight leads to unconcern, independence and detachment with regard to those mental factors (that had previously been verified as impermanent)¹¹⁹.

116 The lists of the mental factors present in the various stages are clearly heterogeneous, each consisting of two different sets, the first of which comprises the specific factors of the respective stage, whereas the second list contains factors equally present in all stages (viz. *phasso*, *vedanā*, etc.). In some instances, the mechanical combination of these two sets has led to repetition: *sati* occurs twice in the case of the Third Dhyāna, *upekkhā* in the case of the Third and the Fourth Dhyāna. Besides, several items of the specific set are particular forms of items of the general set: cp., e.g., *sukha* and *vedanā* in the case of the first three dhyānas; *adukkha-m-asukkhā vedanā* and *vedanā* in the case of the Fourth Dhyāna; and *ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā*, etc., and *saññā* in the case of the first three *āruppas*.

116a I do not think that CPD is correct in explaining *anupadavavatthita* as meaning "individually set up or fixed", although the commentary (Ps IV 87) is probably right in referring *vavatthāna* to the act of noticing the presence of the respective factors in their specific nature. But this is not the meaning of *anupada-* (Ps: = *anupaṭipāṭiyā*; see CPD s.v. *anupadam*).

117 *tyāssa dhammā viditā uppajjanti, viditā upaṭṭhahanti, viditā abbattham gacchanti*. — It should be noted that this sentence seems to express an aspect of observation that goes beyond the mere noticing of the presence of the respective factors though not posterior to it in a temporal sense.

118 *so evaṃ pajānāti: evaṃ kira 'me dhammā dhuṭvā saṃbhonti, hutvā paṭiventī* (acc. to Nāl.-ed.). — *kira* seems to express that the statement is confirmed by the evidence of the preceding personal observation of the arising, presence and disappearance of the respective mental factors. — *so* seems to be, once more (cp. n. 18), used in anaphorical function. As for the difference between factors being consciously noticed when originating, being present and disappearing on the one hand, and the contemplation of [their] arising and disappearance (*udayabbayānupassanā*) on the other, cp. AN No. 4.41 (II 45) where it is said that the former is conducive to mindfulness (*satisampajañña*), the latter to the vanishing of the Cankers (*āsavānaṃ khaya*).

119 *so tesu dhammesu anupāyo anapāyo anissito appaṭibaddho vipparamutto visamyutto . . . viharati*. In opposition to the (Chinese version of the) *Mahāmālunkya-sutta* and to the *Aṭṭhakanāgarasutta* (see ch. J. 3) where the contemplation of the negative nature of the *dhammas* of a *ny* stage was considered to enable, in principle, the vanishing of all Cankers, i.e. complete detachment, the *Anupadasutta* seems to regard the contemplation of the

In the case of *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, however, an immediate determination of the respective factors and their origination, etc., is not possible (because these states lack [clear] ideational or notional consciousness (*saṃjñā*)). Therefore, detachment from the factors constitutive of these states – as against the preceding states up to the Stage of Nothingness the text does not specify them here – is possible only subsequently: a f t e r one has r e e m e r g e d from these states of absorbtion without *saṃjñā*, one contemplates retrospectively (*samanupassati*) the impermanence of those factors which at that moment are already past¹²⁰.

In the treatment of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, the fact that the Sutta consists of two sets of heterogeneous textual elements becomes manifest. For in view of the fact that the old textual element of the *anupūrvavīhāra* pattern concludes with the statement that, after the attainment of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*, “one’s Cankers (*āsrava*) have vanished after one has seen by *prajñā*”, it seems difficult to see the purpose of a further contemplation of impermanence which in the supplementary textual element is said to take place a f t e r one has r e e m e r g e d from that state.

M.

The second text I should like to point to, the *Cūlasuññattasutta*¹²¹, seems, in principle, to belong to the same trend of thought as the *Anupadasutta*. It, too,

impermanence of the mental factors occurring in the First Dhyāna, etc., as conducive to detachment from (the factors of) the r e s p e c t i v e stage only, for in all but the last stages the text says that the attainment of detachment is followed by the comprehension that there is further escape (*nissaraṇa*), which may mean that further detachment is necessary, provided that the sentence did not, originally, follow immediately after each paragraph of the old stereotyped *anupūrvavīhāra* formula; in this case, “escape” would refer, or at least originally have referred, to the subsequent stage of meditation, and *tabbahulikārā* in the (rather difficult) last sentence would refer to a frequent practice not of the comprehension (*pañānana*) of impermanence, as the commentary (Ps IV 90,4) takes it, but of the state of meditation concerned.

120 In this case, *samanupassati* (cp. n. 90) clearly denotes subsequent c o n t e m p l a t i o n of factors no longer available to direct observation. It should, however, be noted that Ps (IV 90,18) reads *samanussarati*. In any case, the term used with reference to the last two stages differs from that used in the case of the preceding stages (viz. *pañānati*).

121 MN No. 121 (= III 104 ff.). The corresponding Sutta in the Chinese Āgamas, viz. MĀ_C No. 190, is almost identical with Peking-Kanjur, Mdo-sna-tshogs, lu 274 b 2 ff. Cp. also Vi 542 a 15 ff. and Y_C 812 c 12 ff. – The text has recently been treated in ERGARDT, *Faith*, pp. 101 ff. ERGARDT’S approach, largely presupposing homogeneity of the single Suttas as well as of the Majjhimanikāya as a whole, is completely different from my own which I have tried to characterize in ch. A of this paper. Apart from this difference of method (which I simply want to state for the sake of clearness), I disagree with ERGARDT in the philological interpretation of some passages of the Sutta. E.g., *suññatāvīhārena* . . . *bahulaṃ viharāmi* does not mean “I, . . . through abiding in emptiness, am . . .

though less closely, appears to be related to, and at the same time to set itself off from, the description of the “*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation”.

In the Cūḷasunñatasutta, various states of e m p t i n e s s (*suññata*), gradually increasing in subtlety, are described. In the first state, the monk, after having removed his attention from the ideation of village (*gāmasaṇṇā*) and of people (*manussasaṇṇā*), fixes his mind (*manasikaroti*) on the uniform or exclusive (*ekatta*)¹²² ideation¹²³ of forest or wilderness (*araññasāṇṇā*), and his mind becomes

abiding in (its) fullness” (ERGARDT, following I.B. HORNER), but is to be understood as “Frequently I am abiding in the state of emptiness” (as for *vihārena viharati*, cp. also BHSD, p. 504; D. SEYFORTH RUEGG, *La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra*, Paris 1969, p. 320). Regarding my interpretation of *ekattaṃ*, see n. 122. Concerning *vimuccati*, see n. 124. *saḷāyatanika* cannot mean “the six sense-organs” but is an adjectival secondary derivation from *saḷāyatana* and must mean something like “connected with the six sense-organs”, as the commentary (Ps IV 154,1) correctly explains (cp. also G. M. NAGAO, *Chūkan* to yuishiki, Tokyo 1978, p. 544). A serious problem is posed by ERGARDT’S (and I. B. HORNER’S) rendering of *taṃ santaṃ idam atthi (ti pajānāti)* as “(he comprehends) ‘that being, this is’”, which he – I do not see why – refers to *kamma*, thereby grouping the Sutta under the heading “Formula eA after *kamma*-experience”. To my mind, the passage means: ‘He notices that that [state] is empty of what is no longer existing in that [state]; what, however, is [still] remaining in that [state], that – which is [still] existing he comprehends [in the form] ‘this is [still] existing’” (slightly different: RUEGG, loc. cit. + Errata p. 4; NAGAO, loc. cit.; cp. also the Sanskrit formula, e.g. *Bodhisattvabhūmi* [ed. WOGIHARA], p. 47, 17 ff.: . . . *tat sad ‘ihāsti’ti . . . prajānāti*). See addenda

- 122 *ekattaṃ* is usually understood as meaning “oneness” or “solitude” (HORNER; ERGARDT, *Faith*, p. 102; RUEGG, op. cit. [n. 121], p. 320). Yet I do not think that this interpretation really makes good sense. Moreover, there is a parallel passage in AN III 343 = IV 344: *idāni ayaṃ āyasmā imaṃ niddākilamathaṃ paṭivinodetvā araññasāṇṇaṃ yeva manasikarissati ekattaṃ*. It is obvious that in this passage *ekattaṃ* can hardly be understood as a substantive, because it should then be in apposition to *araññasāṇṇaṃ*; but although it would be possible to identify “solitude” and “wilderness” (*arañña*), identification of “solitude” and “ideation of wilderness” is not probable. Therefore, it seems preferable to interpret *ekattaṃ* as an adjective corresponding to Skt. *ekātman-* and meaning “having one nature only”, “uniform”; “exclusive”. This interpretation is confirmed by the commentary: “*ekattan ti ekasabhāvaṃ ekagga(tā)bhūtaṃ araññasāṇṇaṃ yeva . . .*” (Mp III 367). It is also preferable in many other occurrences of *ekatta* (and analogously *nānatta*), e.g. in the context of the seven *viññānatthitī* or the nine *sattāṇāsa* (cp., e.g., DN II 69; III 253 and 263) where living beings are classified according to their being *ekatta-* or *nānat-takāyā* and *ekatta-* or *nānattasaṇṇīno*; this cannot, of course, mean that they have, respectively, oneness (or solitude) and difference as their body or their ideas but only that they have uniform (**ekātman*) or different (**nānātman*) bodies or ideas, in spite of the fact that the Sarvāstivāda tradition has *ekatva-* and *nānātva-* (AKBh 115, 15 ff.). The Pali tradition, on the other hand, confirms **ekātman/nānātman* in other places, too (e.g. Ps V 26, 3 ff. [*nānattā* = . . . *anekappakārā*, *ekattā* = *ekā*], or VisM X. 20). The Ps seems to do so also in the case of the Cūḷasunñatasutta: cp. esp. Ps IV 151, 27 f. *ekaṃ araññasāṇṇaṃ paṭicca*, but also 151, 20 and 153, 20; in 151, 11 (*ekattan ti ekabhāvaṃ, ekaṃ . . . ti attho*) we should perhaps read *eka(s)abhāvaṃ* as in Mp III 367. But the Ps is altogether confused in its attempts at construing the word *ekattaṃ* syntactically. This is, in fact, rather difficult in the sentence under discussion (*araññasāṇṇaṃ paṭicca manasikaroti ekattaṃ*). In my opinion, this sentence must be understood in accordance with the passage quoted above from

pleased with this ideation¹²⁴. He then comprehends that [consequently] there are no longer any disturbances¹²⁵ that may arise on account of the ideation of village or of people, but that there is still that small quantity of disturbance (*darathamattā*) that [arises] on account of [the fact that there is still another ideation, viz.] the uniform or exclusive ideation of wilderness; [for]¹²⁶ his consciousness¹²⁷ is, it is true, empty of the ideation of village or of people, but he also knows that there is still non-emptiness¹²⁸, viz. on account of [the fact that] the uniform or exclusive ideation of wilderness is still there.

In the following states, the mind is concentrated on the uniform or exclusive ideation of earth (*paṭhavi*¹²⁹) and on the ideations of the four Spheres Beyond

the AN (*araññasaññāṃ yeva manasikarissati ekattaṃ*), i.e. *s a ñ ñ a ṃ* should be taken, as in the preceding words (*amanasikarivā gāmasaññāṃ* etc.), as the object of *manasikr-*, and *ekattaṃ* as an attribute to *saññāṃ*; but then *paṭicca* can hardly be construed. Actually, there is no equivalent of *paṭicca* in the Chinese version (737 a 13: "... should repeatedly concentrate upon the single idea of wilderness [lit.: having-no-business]") as well as in the Tibetan translation (*lu* 275 a 4 f.: *dgon par 'du šes pa'am de las kha cig yid la bya'o*, 'am de las kha cig, which seems to correspond to something like **tad e k a t y ā ṃ vā*, is strange). In the Pali version, *paṭicca* may, in fact, have intruded into the present sentence from those which follow, where it is both meaningful and confirmed by Chinese and Tibetan.

- 123 See n. 51. *araññasaññā* (HORNER, ERGARDT: "perception of (the) forest"; CPD: "forest-sentiment"; RUEGG: "idée de la forêt") may mean, if I am right, either the conscious (and perhaps even subjectively approved) apperception (i.e. the apprehension of the characteristics including the formation of an idea or notion) of wilderness or forest in the case of a person who is actually dwelling there, or the deliberate imagination or ideation (i.e. visualization of the characteristics including notional determination) of wilderness in the case of a person who is not actually dwelling there. Cp. also PMAñj I, 167 (ad VisM II. 54).
- 124 *tassa araññasaññāya cittaṃ pakkhandati pasīdati santiṭṭhati vimuccati*; omitted in Tibetan and Chinese. We should read *adhimuccati* instead of *vimuccati*, acc. to Ps IV 151, 23 and Nāl.-ed. confirmed by passages like MN I 186 [v.CPD p. 137] and ŚrBh 403, 6 f. and 497, 1 f. (where Skt. *na vimucyate* must be corrected into *nādhimucyate* acc. to Tib. *mos par mi 'gyur* and Chinese). In view of the similarity of the akṣaras *va* and *dha* in some older Indian alphabets, the corruption of (*a*)*dhimuc-* into *vimuc-* (the latter word being quite frequent but not making good sense in the present context) poses no problem paleographically.
- 125 As for *daratha*, cp. the "quasi-synonyms" it is associated with in MN III 132 (*daratha-kilamatha-pariāhāṇaṃ*) and III 288 (*darathā. . . santāpā . . . pariāhā*); Tib. *ñon mōṅs pa'i gnas* ("ground for trouble").
- 126 This is, to my understanding, the logical connection between the two comprehensions. Actually, in Chinese and Tibetan the comprehension of a remnant of disturbance still existing follows upon the comprehension that there is still a certain non-emptiness. But I think the order of the Pali version is the original one because the text continues with the "emptiness formula" translated in n. 121.
- 127 *saññāgata*, lit. something like "what is ideation" or "all that is ideation" (cp. BHSD s.v. *gata* 2), *gata* seemingly expressing or indicating the aspect of collectivity or unspecified totality.
- 128 Cp. CPD s.v. *asuññata*.
- 129 I.e., as the text makes clear, the ideation of earth as such, comparable to a stretched bull's hide, exclusive of particular aspects such as high and low. It is obvious that this ideation is a deliberate act of imagination. As for the present context in which the *paṭhavisāññā* is fol-

Visible Matter (viz. *ākāsānañcāyatanā*, etc.)¹³⁰, one after the other, and the monk knows that all these states, though empty of the ideation of the preceding states, respectively, are still not empty of their own ideation and the remnant of disturbance it constitutes.

Finally, the monk fixes his mind upon the "mental concentration beyond [any ideation of] characteristics (or mental images)¹³¹" (*animitto cetosamādhi*)¹³², a state which seems to be closely related to, if not identical with, the Cessation of

lowed by *ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā*, etc., cp. the ten *kaṣiṇāyatanas* where the exclusive ideation of earth without limits is the first stage of a series culminating in the exclusive ideation of unlimited *ākāsa* and *viññāṇa*.

- 130 In the Anupadasutta (MN III 27 f.), the compounds *ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā*, etc., can hardly mean anything else but the ideation which, besides *cittēkaggatā*, constitutes the [meditative] state of Infinity of Space/Ether, etc.; for this state is essentially characterized by [the ideation] "space/ether is infinite". Or if we take *ākāsānañcāyatana* as an objective reality (or at least as an objective content), *ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā*, etc., may mean "ideation [having] the Sphere of Infinity of Space [as its content]", etc., or "ideation [in the form] '[this is] the Sphere of Infinity of Space'", etc., an interpretation which is supported by passages like MN I 2 f. (*ākāsānañcāyatanam ākāsānañcāyatanato sañjānāti*, etc.), or AN V 7 ff. and 318 where we are told that a monk may attain such a kind of meditative concentration that he will not have, with reference to the Sphere of Infinity of Space, etc., the idea or notion "[this is] the Sphere of Infinity of Space", etc. (*na ākāsānañcāyatane ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī assa*, etc., after *na paṭhaviyaṃ paṭhavisaññī assa*, etc., which makes it clear that the locative is a *viṣayasaptamī*; cp. also AN V 321 where the same idea is expressed in a different phraseology: *na paṭhaviyaṃ manasikareyya*, . . . *na ākāsānañcāyatanam manasikareyya*, i.e. "he will not fix his mind on, or pay attention to, earth", etc.). It is probable though not certain that the expressions *ākāsānañcāyatane ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī*, etc., refer to an actual attainment of the meditative state of Infinity of Space (negated though it is in the context) as do probably the terms *ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā*, etc., in the Cūḷasuññatasutta and, definitely so, in AN IV 413 f. Doubt may arise with regard to the term *nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññā*; for how can there be *saññā* in a state expressly defined as lacking it? Yet it is also, by its very name, defined as not completely lacking it, and there can be no doubt that AN IV 414 understands the term as referring to a *saññā* constitutive of or taking place in that state – a *saññā* which may be understood as dim or fading, thus in a certain sense not a *saññā*, i.e. not a clear *saññā* –, and this may also be true of the Cūḷasuññatasutta (cp. also MN II 265). But Chinese (737 c 1 [footnote 12 is wrong]) and Tibetan (*lu* 277 a 2) may have been aware of the problem because they omit the section on *naivasamjñānāsaññāyatanā*. – Another difficulty is the exact interpretation of the combination *-saññāṃ manasikaroti*. Does it express or imply the actual realization of the respective *saññā* and the state constituted by it, or does it merely denote a concentrative or intellectual effort towards that *saññā*?

- 131 On this term, cp. KŌITSU YOKOYAMA, *nimitta* (sō) ni tsuite, in: Bukkyōgaku 1/1976, pp. 88 ff.

- 132 Chinese (737 c 3) like Pali, but Tibetan (*lu* 277 a 3) has **animitta-dhātu* instead. Focusing concentration on *animittā dhātu* (= *nibbāna*?) is, according to MN I 296, one of the two causes for entering *animittā cetovimutti*. Vasubandhu quotes this passage in his *Karmasiddhi* (ed. Lamotte, § 29; **animittadhātusamāpatti* instead of *animittā cetovimutti*) and expressly refers it to (*saṃjñāvedayita*) *nirodhasamāpatti*.

all Ideation and Feeling (*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*)¹³³. The monk then knows that in this state his consciousness¹³⁴ is empty of even the most subtle forms of ideation, i.e. that ideative consciousness has totally ceased, but that there is still non-emptiness and a small quantity of disturbance on account of [the fact that] the body containing the six sense-faculties (*saḷāyatānika*) [still continues to exist] because of life [having not yet come to an end] (*jīvitapaccayā*).

Thereafter the text once more starts from the situation that a monk fixes his mind on *animitto cetosamādhi*¹³⁵. This time, however, what he knows is that even this highest possible state of concentration is produced on purpose (*abhisāṅkhata*), brought about intentionally (*abhisāñcetayita*), and that it is therefore impermanent (*anicca*) and subject to destruction (*nirodhadhamma*)¹³⁶. Due to this insight, the monk's mind is freed from the Cankers (*āsava*), and he realizes this fact¹³⁷ and knows that there will be no rebirth for him, i.e. that he is an Arhat¹³⁸. Then the text returns to its usual pattern: the monk knows that his consciousness¹³⁹ is empty of the Cankers but that there is (as before) still non-emptiness and a small quantity of disturbance on account of [the fact that] the body containing the six sense-faculties [still continues to exist] because of life [having not yet come to an end]. This is said to be the highest form of realization of Emptiness (*suññatāvakkanti*)¹⁴⁰.

133 Cp. esp. SN 40.1–9 where *animitto cetosamādhi* is substituted for *saññāvedayitanirodha* in the *anupūrvavivhāra* pattern. The equivalence of the two terms seems to be supported by the fact that at least in the Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition the *nimittas* are the typical objective correlate of *saṃjñā* (YOKOYAMA, op. cit. [n. 131], pp. 92, 107), the absence of *nimittas* consequently implying cessation of *saṃjñā*. Cp. also the preceding note. In any case, the difference of terminology should not be neglected as meaningless. There are, in fact, a few passages in which *animitto cetosamādhi* is characterized or used in a way that does not wholly fit its identity with *saññāvedayitanirodha*. Cp., e.g., DN II 100 where *animitto cetosamādhi* implies only the cessation of some feelings (*vedanā*), and AN 6.60 (III 397) where *animitto cetosamādhi* follows immediately after the Fourth Dhyāna (the same is, however, true also of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* in SN 48.40). In the case of the Cūḷasūññatasutta, *animitto cetosamādhi* does not seem to be essentially different from *saññāvedayitanirodha*; the explanation of the commentary (Ps IV 153, 24 f.: *animittam cetosamādhin ti vipassanācittasamādhim. so hi niccanimittādivirahito animitto ti vuccati*) is clearly artificial. But cp. also n. 147a.

134 See n. 127.

135 This repetition is omitted in Chinese (737 c 9) and Tibetan (lu 277 a 7 f.).

136 In Tibetan (lu 277 a 8 f.) and Chinese (737 c 11), the consequence is not impermanence but undesirability: *de la ni mñon par dga' bar bya ba'am / mñon par brjod par bya ba'am / lhags par chags par bya ba'am / lhags par chags śin gnas par bya bar mi rigs so* (something like **tan na yuktam abhinanditum va abhilasitum* [Tib. wrongly *abhipapitum*] *vā adhyavasitum vā adhyavasāya vā sthātum*, cp. SWTF p. 39).

137 Same text as in n. 20.

138 The stereotyped formula *khīṇā jāti*, etc. (ERGARDT, *Faith*, p. 3).

139 See n. 127.

140 In Chinese (737 c 20 f.) and Tibetan (lu 277 b 6), it is in addition called the "Liberation of mind (*cetovimukti*), which is, due to the vanishing of the Cankers, free from Cankers (*anāsravā*), and not produced on purpose (*anabhisamskārtā*, i.e. not produced for attaining a special mundane aim[?]); cp. also Vi 543 a 17 f.

It will have become clear from the foregoing analysis of the Cūḷasuṇṇātasutta that the final portion is repetitive¹⁴¹ in so far as both sections are, down to the very wording, identical in the beginning (fixing one's mind on *animitto cetosamādhī*) as well as in the end (realization that the only cause of non-emptiness and disturbance that is left is the body with the sense-faculties); the result is that there is, as regards the cause of disturbance that still remains¹⁴², no progress but stagnation. This appears strange in a text which up to this point had strictly followed a pattern of a sequence of structurally parallel but p r o g r e s s i v e spiritual stages. In such a framework, the two final sections give the impression of being either two juxtaposed alternative versions or a juxtaposition of an original and a revised version of the final portion.

There are indications that the latter possibility is to the point:

1) Firstly, the two elements which are specific to the *second* version of the final section relax the parallelism of the different sections of the present text, but each of these elements can be traced to other contexts where they fit in excellently:

a) The pattern of comprehension of impermanence on account of being produced on purpose (*abhisañkhata*, *abhisāñcetayita*) is typical of the Aṭṭhakanāgarasutta¹⁴³ and probably comes from that direction¹⁴⁴.

b) The following passage about mind being freed from the Cankers (*āsava*), etc., is identical with the final portion of the old *Ster.Det.Descr.* (See ch. C).

2) Moreover, the fact that these elements are heterogeneous seems to be supported by certain inconsistencies arising from their combination with the stereotyped pattern of the Cūḷasuṇṇātasutta:

141 This repetition is not found in Chinese and Tibetan (see n. 135). It can hardly be seen why it should have been introduced in the Pali version if it had not been there in the beginning, but it is easily conceivable that it was later omitted by the version underlying Chinese and Tibetan just because it was felt to be an unnecessary repetition.

142 Of course, there is a distinction, between the two final sections, concerning the causes of disturbance that are known to have d i s a p p e a r e d; but according to the structural pattern of the Sutta what is known to have disappeared in the later stage should be identical with what had been known to be still existing in the preceding stage, and this precisely is not true in the case of the two final sections, because what is known to have disappeared in the second final section (viz. the Cankers) is not said to be still existing in the first one, and what is known to continue to exist in the first final section (viz. the body with the sense-faculties) still continues to do so in the second.

143 MN No. 52; see ch. J. 3.

144 It may, but need not necessarily, have been coined with reference to *animitto cetosamādhī*, on the analogy of the Aṭṭhakanāgarasutta as we have it (which stops with *ākiñcaṇṇāyatana*, see ch. J. 3). There may also have existed a form of that Sutta which included, somehow like the Anupadasutta, *naivasamjijñānāsamjijñāyatana* (as, in fact, the Chinese version does, see n. 95) and *saṃjijñāvedayitanirodha*. Of course, this is only a possibility. But surely it will be granted that only a part of the materials, or combinations and variations of materials, that emerged during the early period will have consolidated into what we may call an (oral-)literary form so that it came to be included and preserved in the canonical collections.

a) After the (stereotyped) introductory phrases ending in the statement that the monk's mind becomes pleased with *animitto cetosamādhī*¹⁴⁵, the abrupt switching over to the comprehension of its impermanence, i.e. its *n e g a t i v e* nature, is surprising. In the preceding sections, the transition is less abrupt: after his mind had become pleased with the respective ideation or state, the monk had first recognized the *p o s i t i v e* aspect that the former ideations and the disturbance resulting from them do not exist any more, and only then had he realized the negative aspect that there is still some remnant of non-emptiness and of a cause of disturbance.

b) After the recognition that one's mind (*citta*) has been liberated from the Cankers and that there will not be any further rebirth (i.e. the "Arhat formula" of the *Ster.Det.Descr.*) the recognition that one's (ideative) consciousness (*saññāgata*) is now empty of the Cankers (i.e. the application of the peculiar stereotyped pattern of the present Sutta) appears redundant. Moreover, an association of the Cankers with (ideative) consciousness (*saññāgata*) instead of "mind" (*citta*) appears unusual.

c) The statement that after the destruction of the Cankers there remains only the body with the sense-faculties does not seem to be true in a strict sense. For during as well as after the comprehension of or insight into the impermanence of even *animitto cetosamādhī* – an insight which is definitely characterized by notion or ideation and therefore can hardly take place within *animitto cetosamādhī* itself – there will assuredly be elements of ideation, feeling, etc., as well.

In the *first* version of the final section, on the other hand, the statement that [only] the body and the sense-faculties are left can be understood in the strict sense because it refers to *animitto cetosamādhī* itself, in which actually ideations and feelings have ceased. As other inconsistencies, too, do not seem to exist in this version which is altogether on the lines of the stereotyped pattern of the present Sutta, it appears to be the original one. If this is true, the original form of the text would have been a peculiar treatment of a series of states of concentration culminating in *animitto cetosamādhī* (which seems to be more or less identical with *saññāvedayitanirodha*), and thus a kind of parallel to the *anupūrvavīhāra* pattern¹⁴⁶ and, still more closely, to the Eight Liberations (*vimokṣa/vimokkha*)¹⁴⁷.

The fact that the monk recognizes the existence of a last cause of disturbance (viz. the body with the sense-faculties) even in the state of *animitto cetosamādhī* suggests, it is true, that the series should *c o n t i n u e*, in a way that this remaining cause of disturbance, too, is eliminated. But this does not support the authenticity of the second version because precisely this expectancy is not fulfilled by it, for it, too, ends with the statement that that same cause of disturbance still persists.

145 As this sentence is missing in Chinese and Tibetan (cp. n. 124), the argument is not valid for the version underlying these translations.

146 Cp. esp. AN 9.33 (IV 412 ff.) where the attainment of each of the last five *anupūrvavīhāras* is characterized as the cessation of the *i d e a t i o n* (*saññā*) of the preceding stage, respectively.

147 See n. 52a.

It could be argued that in this case it goes without saying that this last cause of disturbance will, at the moment of death, automatically cease to exist, without any further spiritual exercise being required, because on account of the destruction of the Cankers that person will have become an Arhat who is not reborn anymore. But why should such an argument not be possible in the case of the first version if we consider it against the background of the “*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory”? For in terms of this theory, by entering into *animitto cetosamādhī* the monk would, in fact, become an Arhat.

Viewed from this angle, the second version of the final section appears to be explicable as another attempt at “including” materials from the *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* current into the “intellectualist” trend. In this case, the “inclusion” seems to have been effectuated by means of merely adding a reworked version of the final section. Thus, the recast text seems to follow the “*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory” in so far as it treats – unlike the *Mahāmālunkya*sutta and the *Anupadasutta* – Liberation as taking place on the basis of *animitto cetosamādhī* only. But it is not in or by *animitto cetosamādhī* as such that Liberation is effectuated but only by means of the comprehension of the impermanence, i.e. negative nature, of even this most elevated form of meditative concentration^{147a}. It is clear that such a comprehension is – in the sense of the *Anupadasutta* – not possible in *animitto cetosamādhī* but only after having reemerged from it. Nay, there is, in the *Cūlasuññatasutta*, not even a clear indication that this comprehension really presupposes that one has, before, actually dwelt in the state of *animitto cetosamādhī*, and the same may be true of the preceding states of concentration too¹⁴⁸. It is, in fact, not inconceivable that the conclusion had been reached, by certain representatives of the “intellectualist” trend, that for comprehending the impermanence, etc., of everything including even the highest stages of concentration it is not at all necessary actually to enter them¹⁴⁹, and that also from this point of view the special aptitude and the enormous effort involved (see ch. I) are altogether dispensable.

147a (See addenda.)

148 From the point of view of the recast version, the expression *saññam manasikaroti* (see n. 130, end) may, in fact, merely denote an intellectual concentration on the respective ideation or notion, not including actual attainment, whereas from the point of view of the original version such an actual attainment was most probably implied. Yet, this problem can only be settled by a meticulous and comprehensive investigation of the semantic possibilities of this expression.

149 Cp. also MN III 243 f. where the comprehension of the fact that the four States Beyond Visible Matter (*ākāśānācāyatana*, etc.) are produced on purpose (*saṅkhata*; cp. the following *n’eva taṃ abhisankharomi na abhisañceta yāmi*) is clearly based on the hypothetical consideration that if one would dedicate one’s purified equanimity to [the attainment of] these states, it would subsist in the respective state for a long time, but still that state would have been produced on purpose (and would therefore be impermanent).

N.

It will have become clear from the preceding exposition, provisional and incomplete though it is, that there are already in the Sūtrapīṭaka various, even conflicting, views or theories of Liberating Insight (and Enlightenment). Against the background of this situation, the considerable divergencies of opinion we find with regard to this matter in the schools of "Hīnayāna" Buddhism will appear less surprising. I confine myself to sketching a few lines of connection.

1.

The Sarvāstivādin / Vaibhāṣika school, as is well known, has, in principle, stuck to the old view of Liberating Insight (and Enlightenment) consisting in the comprehension of the four Noble Truths¹⁵⁰. Yet, as is well known, too, the structure of this comprehension was considerably elaborated by the Sarvāstivādins, one motive for this being the integration of essential aspects of the developments I have tried to point out in this article. E.g., by systematically developing beginnings, traceable already in the Sūtrapīṭaka, of a differentiation of several stages of Liberating Insight into a clear-cut distinction between the first Insight (*darśanamārga*) and its subsequent repeated practice (*bhāvanāmārga*)¹⁵¹ and by stating that the first Insight into the four Noble Truths destroys, to put it roughly, only wrong views and doubt concerning these four Truths (or the entities they include) respectively¹⁵², the exigency of a psychologically plausible relation between the content and the effect of Liberating Insight was completely met¹⁵³. The doctrine that Liberation is won by comprehending the negative nature of all states of existence (ch. I) is expressly integrated into the comprehension of the Truth of Suffering by means of the doctrine of the Sixteen Aspects (*ṣoḍaśākārah*)¹⁵⁴, the four aspects under which the Truth of Suffering can be contemplated or comprehended being impermanence, disagreeableness, emptiness, and not-being-the-Self¹⁵⁵. The tendency to consider meditative concentration (especially entering into the *dhyānas*) as unnecessary for Liberating Insight was integrated by the Sarvāstivādins by means of the doctrine that it may be acquired in the *anāgāmya*¹⁵⁶, which may be called a kind of intermediate state between the ordinary state of mind and the First Dhyāna as the lowest stage of meditative concentration¹⁵⁷. But

150 AK(Bh) 350, 1 ff.; FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* III, pp. 74; 83 f.; 86.

151 FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* III, pp. 74; 84 ff.

152 Ibid. p. 77 ff.

153 Ibid. p. 77.

154 Ibid. p. 82; AKBh 400, 1 ff.

155 AKBh 395, 21 f. and 400, 2 ff.; AKVy 535, 2 ff.

156 FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* III, p. 100.

157 Cp. AKp VI 235 f. (note 3); ib. VIII, p. 179.

it can also be attained in any of the four *dhyānas* as well as in the so-called “state between [the First and the Second] Dhyāna” (*dhyānāntara*¹⁵⁸)¹⁵⁹. Texts which only state its acquisition in the Fourth Dhyāna (as does the *Ster.Det.Descr.*) can be explained as referring to the Enlightenment of the Buddha which actually took place in the Fourth Dhyāna¹⁶⁰. The opinion of texts like the *Mahāmālunkyasutta* (ch. J) that Liberating Insight is also possible in the first three Spheres beyond Visible Matter is referred to the Path of (repeated) Practice (*bhāvanāmārga*)¹⁶¹. Even the view that Nirvāṇa is the content of Liberating Insight could easily be integrated into the theory of Liberation through Insight into the four Noble Truths by understanding the Insight into the Truth of Cessation as a comprehension of Nirvāṇa similar to that of the *Mahāmālunkyasutta*¹⁶², Nirvāṇa, however, being conceived in Sarvāstivāda as an unconditioned entity called Cessation by Comprehension (*pratisaṅkhyānirodha*) (or better as a class of such entities)¹⁶³. There is, in Sarvāstivāda, no final Liberation by a mystical ecstasy into a supramundane sphere, no liberating function of the attainment of *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* (cp. ch. H), which is regarded by the Sarvāstivādins to be an entity that is only similar to Nirvāṇa¹⁶⁴ and to be attained in a state of absorption completely devoid of any kind of consciousness or mental factors whatsoever^{164a}. Yet even the principle of gradual detachment from spheres of mundane existence by means of the meditative realization of the next higher sphere has found its place in the Sarvāstivāda system in the form of the “Mundane Path of Practice” (*laukiko bhāvanāmārgaḥ*)¹⁶⁵ which, however, is only an intramundane process which cannot go beyond the Sphere of Neither-Consciousness-nor-Non-consciousness¹⁶⁶ because there is no further mundane sphere and because Nirvāṇa and *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* have no longer any cosmological value, not even in an analogous sense.

2.

As for the (later) Pāli school (Theravāda), the main sources on which its theory of Liberating Insight is based appear to be Suttas like AN 10.6 discussed in ch. J.

- 158 Cp. AK(Bh) 448,7 ff.; AKp VIII 180 f.; FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* IV (1972), p. 96; *dhyānāntara* or *dhyānāntarikā* (AKBh 68,19), which is defined as a variety of the First Dhyāna without *vitarka*, was introduced in order to integrate the *saṃādhi* which has no *vitarka* but only *vicāra*, of passages like DN III 219 and SN IV 360.
- 159 FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* III, p. 100.
- 160 Cp. AK(Bh) 451,18–452,2 (ms. reads *caturtha* instead of *caturbhya*).
- 161 Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 368,4 f. (AKp VI 238); the non-occurrence of (supramundane) Liberating Insight in *naivasamjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* is stated, e.g., in AKBh 386,10 f.; AKVy 570,9 f.; Vi 433 c 11 ff.
- 162 Cp. the *ākāras* of *nirodhasatya* which include *śānta* and *praṇīta* (cp. AKBh 400,6 and 11; 401,5 f.; FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* III, p.82).
- 163 Cp. AKBh 327,12 f.: “*pratisaṅkhyānirodho yo viśaṃyoga*” (AK I,6a) *iti nirodhasatyaṃ*. As for *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*, see, e.g., AK(Bh) 3,24 ff.; FRAUWALLNER, *Ph.B.* 129 f.
- 164 Cp., e.g., AKBh 363,13 f.; Abhidharmadīpa(vṛtti) 93,5 f.; Vi 782 c 18 ff.; Abhidharmasāra (T 1552) 932 c 8.
- 164a AKBh 69,24 ff.; 73,3 f.
- 165 Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 368,7 ff. (AKp VI 238 f.).
- 166 Cp., e.g., AK(Bh) 366,14 ff. (AKp VI 233); FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* III, p. 96.

5 and the Mahāmālunkyasutta (see esp. ch. J.4). The Theravādins seem to have interpreted the latter as treating of not only Liberating Insight proper but also the decisive preparatory phase. To this phase belong, according to them, the entrance into the four *dhyānas* and the first three States Beyond Visible Matter¹⁶⁷ (which they understand as alternative but not necessary¹⁶⁸ starting-points¹⁶⁹) and insight into the negative nature^{169a} – essentially impermanence, disagreeableness, and Not-having-or-being-a-Self¹⁷⁰ – of the *dhammas* that constitute those meditative states (a comprehension which they consider to be the result of a long process of analytical observation or contemplation that only takes place after one has re-emerged from meditative concentration¹⁷¹). Liberating Insight proper has Nirvāṇa for its sole object¹⁷². Thus it corresponds only to the last element of the description of Liberating Insight in the Mahāmālunkyasutta, to the element which corresponds to Suttas like AN 10.6, viz. the comprehension of Nirvāṇa as peaceful and excellent. Yet, the Nirvāṇa-experience of later Theravādins seems to be less intellectual¹⁷³. Nevertheless, it is not a mystico-existential anticipation of Nirvāṇa as in the “*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory” – in Theravāda too, *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* has come to be regarded as a completely non-conscious state, altogether dissociated from Liberating Insight – but a mystical cognition (*ñāṇa*) or intuition (*ñāṇadassana*)¹⁷⁴ taking place in one of the four, or the five¹⁷⁵,

167 They are considered to be special applications of the Fourth Dhyāna: FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* IV (1972), p. 105; NYANATILOKA, *B. Wb.*, p. 92.

168 There are followers of a Path of pure or mere analytical insight (*sukkhavipassaka* or *sudhāvipassanāyānika*, cp. VisM XVIII.5; VIII.237; NYANATILOKA, *B. Wb.*, p. 216) who do not enter into the *dhyānas* before attaining Liberating Insight proper (cp. VisM XXI.112).

169 VisM XVIII.3; cp. also XXI.112–114.

169a As for insight into the negative nature of *dhammas* as a (merely) preparatory stage which does not necessarily include finding pleasure in Nirvāṇa, cp. SN III 134 (. . . *mayhaṃ pi kho etaṃ evaṃ hoti – rūpaṃ aniccaṃ, . . . anattā, . . .*’ *ti; atha ca pana me . . . nibbāne cittaṃ na pakkhandaṭṭi nappasīdati*. . .). This Sutta, by the way, seems to have had considerable influence on the Śrāvakabhūmi (ŚrBh 496 ff.), according to which, nevertheless, Liberating Insight consists in a vision not of Nirvāṇa alone but of all the four Noble Truths (ŚrBh 500, 15 ff.).

170 Cp. Ps III 146,8 f.: *nissattaṭṭhena suññato, na attaṭṭhena anattato*.

171 VisM XVIII.3; cp. also the explanation of the phrase (of the Mahāmālunkyasutta) *so tattha ṭhito* (MN I 436,3) as *tāya tilakkhaṇārammaṇāya vipassanāya ṭhito* (Ps III 146,25 f. ≈ Mp IV 196,23 f. [ad AN 9.36, see ch. K]) instead of the more natural explanation *tasmim paṭhamajjhāne ṭhito* (Mp IV 196,6 f.).

172 See n. 178.

173 Cp. Ps III 146,18 ff. (= Mp IV 196,16 ff.) which refers the respective portion of the Mahāmālunkyasutta both to preparatory insight and to Liberating Insight proper (i.e. to the *maggacitta*) and makes it clear that [in the case of Liberating Insight proper] one does not verbalize [its contents] in the form “this is peaceful, this is excellent” but only focusses one’s mind on [Nibbāna] while penetrating into it in such a form (*iminā . . . ākārena taṃ paṭivijjhanto*).

174 Cp. VisM XXII.2.

175 In the pattern of five *dhyānas*, an additional *dhyāna* has been inserted in which there is only *vicāra* but no *vitarka* and which thus corresponds to the *dhyānāntara* of the Sarvastivādins (see n. 158); cp. FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* IV (1972), p. 96.

*dhyānas*¹⁷⁶. It is only the principle that Craving for mundane things or existence can be extirpated only by a realization of the Supramundane, i. e. Nirvāṇa, that the Theravādins, seemingly on lines of Suttas like AN 10.6, have taken over from the “*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory”.

However, the statements on Liberating Insight in some Theravāda sources, especially the *Paṭisaṃbhidāmagga*¹⁷⁷ and the *Visuddhimagga*, present additional difficulties. The text of the *Visuddhimagga*, it is true, is quite unambiguous in declaring that only Nirvāṇa is the object (*ārammaṇa*) of the moment of Liberating Insight (i. e. the *magga-kkhaṇa*)¹⁷⁸. On the other hand, the text asserts the doctrine that this very same Liberating Insight (*maggañāṇa*) fulfils a fourfold function (*kicca*) and that in this one moment all the four Noble Truths are “attained” (*abhisam-i*)¹⁷⁹. But the term “attainment” (*abhisamaya*) does not seem to be used in a univocal sense in this context; for the text specifies that the Truth of Suffering (*dukkhasacca*) is “attained” in the sense of “knowing completely” (*pariññā*), the Truth of Origination (*samudayasacca*) in the sense of “elimination” (*pahāna*), the Truth of Cessation (*nirodhasacca*), i. e. Nirvāṇa, in the sense of “realization” (*sacchikiriya*), and the Truth of the Path (*maggasacca*) in the sense of “practising” (*bhāvanā*)¹⁸⁰. It seems that, in the case of the Truth of Origination and the Truth of the Path, “attainment” (*abhisamaya*) does not mean a gnoseological act. The same ought to be true also of the Truth of Suffering, and there seems to be an effort to interpret the term *pariññā* accordingly, viz. as *pahānapariññā*¹⁸¹, provided that this term is intended to mean “*pariññā* [consisting in] elimination”¹⁸². But such an interpretation of *pariññā* is rather strange; it would be far easier to interpret not *pariññā* but *sacchikiriya* in a non-gnoseological sense (viz. as realization = Verwirklichung [of the cessation of the respective Causes of Suffering]), and to retain the gnoseological value of *pariññā*. Such an interpretation, however, would not fit the basic position of the *Visuddhimagga*, but it is actually found in an explanation of “comprehension or attainment [of all the four Noble Truths] by one [single moment of Insight]” (*ekābhisamaya*) referred to in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*¹⁸³.

176 Cp. VisM XXI.112–114; FRAUWALLNER, A.St. IV (1972), p. 106 f.

177 According to FRAUWALLNER, A.St. IV (1972), p. 124 f., this text was the latest of all Abhidharma works to be incorporated in the Theravāda canon.

178 Cp., e.g., VisM VIII.236; XXI.71; 124; XXII.13; 40; 127; Ps III 146,21 (= Mp IV 196,19); cp. also Paṭis I 116 f.

179 VisM XXII.92 ff.

180 Ibid.; cp. also Paṭis I 118.

181 VisM XXII.108; cp. also XX.3 f.

182 Cp. VisM XXII.96: *yathā nāvā orimaṃ tīraṃ pajahati, evaṃ maggañāṇaṃ dukkhaṃ pariñāti*. – Of course, grammatically it would be equally possible to explain the compound *pahāna-pariññā* in the sense of “complete knowledge [leading to] elimination”; if this is the right interpretation, my presumption that the term *pahānapariññā* aims at avoiding or veiling the gnoseological meaning inherent in the term *pariññā* would seem to be not to the point.

183 AKBh 352,2 f.; cp. also 351,14 f.

The pattern looks like an attempt at *h a r m o n i z i n g* the old doctrine of Liberating Insight as comprehension of the four Noble Truths with doctrines according to which its actual content is only *o n e* of these Truths: the Truth of Suffering (*dukkhasatya*, cp. ch. I), or the Truth of Cessation (*nirodhasatya*), i. e. Nirvāṇa, as in the Visuddhimagga.

Yet, the situation in the Visuddhimagga (and already in the Paṭisaṃbhidāmagga) is still more complex, because there are passages which give a *g n o s e o l o g i c a l* meaning to the term *abhisamaya* in the case of *a l l* the four Noble Truths. It seems that in the one moment of Liberating Insight (*maggakkhaṇa*), although it realizes Nibbāna as its sole object, yet the other Truths, too, are somehow *s e e n* or *u n d e r s t o o d*¹⁸⁴. The question is which kind of “understanding” (*paṭivedha*) is intended. The Paramatthamañjūsā uses the *n e g a t i v e* term *asammoha* (*-paṭivedha*)¹⁸⁵ which may indicate that there is no actual cognition of the other Truths, as in the case of the Truth of Cessation which is said to be manifested distinctly (*paccakkhakaraṇa*)¹⁸⁶, but only some *i m p l i c i t* or *v i r t u a l* kind of “knowledge” on the basis of which *a f t e r w a r d s*: a completely clear and adequate actual cognition of anyone of the Truths and their aspects can arise¹⁸⁷. This appears to be a different attempt at harmonizing, which, however, in the Visuddhimagga does not seem to be clearly distinguished from the first one.

3.

It is not possible to give in this paper a detailed exposition of the doctrine of Liberating Insight as set forth in Harivarman's *T a t t v a - o r S a t y a s i d d h i*¹⁸⁸, but a few provisional hints should be to the point.

184 VisM XXII.92 (*nirodham ārammaṇaṃ karitvā cattāri pi saccāni pāpuṇāti passati paṭivijjhati*) and 103; Paṭis I 119.

185 PMaṇj, vol. III, p. 1634, l. 15: *asammohavasena paṭivijjhati* (referring to *dukkhasacca*); l. 16: *asammohato abhisameti* (referring to *samudayasacca*); l. 18 f.: *maggam asammohato paṭivijjhati*; l. 23 f.: *nirodhasaccam ekaṃ ārammaṇapaṭivedhena, cattāri pi saccāni asammohapaṭivedhena maggañāṇaṃ* (subject!) *paṭivijjhati*; p. 1637, l. 10 ff.: *maggāñāṇaṃ hi nirodham eva ārammaṇaṃ karontam pi yo so dukkhādisu . . . saccaṭṭho, tappaticchādaka-sammoha-viddhamṣanena tam . . . paṭivijjhaṇtam . . . pavattati* (cp., however, also n. 186); p. 1640, l. 20 and 22 f.: *na hi dukkhaparīñāsamudayappahānāni dukkhasamudaya-saccārammanena nānena kātum sakkuṇeyyāni. nibbānārammaṇena pana tattha itaradvaye ca* (i.e. with regard to Nibbāna as well as to the other two, viz. *dukkha-* and *samudayasacca*) *sammohaṃ viddhamṣentena sakkā kātum . . .*

186 PMaṇj III, p. 1634, l. 20 f. (ad VisM XXII. 92): *'nirodham' ti nibbānaṃ, 'sacchikiriyābhisamayenā' ti paccakkhakaraṇasankhātena paṭivijjanena*. Cp., however, also p. 1637, l. 10 ff., where *paccakkham karontam eva* (or read *iva*?) refers to the *saccaṭṭha* of *a l l* Truths.

187 PMaṇj III, p. 1637, l. 12 f.: *yato aparabhāge . . . soḷasa pi saccaṭṭhā ariyassa hatthāmalakaṃ viya yāthāvato upaṭṭhahanti*.

188 FUKUHARA, Jōjitsuron no kenkyū (1969), was, unfortunately, not accessible to me. – I do not refer, in my notes, to N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI's retranslation of Harivarman's work into Sanskrit (Baroda 1975), which poses serious methodological problems.

Harivarman expressly rejects the opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas according to which Liberation is achieved by the full comprehension of the four Noble Truths¹⁸⁹; for according to him the usual canonical explanation shows that the four Noble Truths refer to Conventional Truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) only¹⁹⁰. Thus, the doctrine of Liberating Insight propounded in the *Ster.Det.Descr.* (ch. C) is rejected or, more precisely, referred to another stage of the Path of Liberation¹⁹¹.

In some passages, a decisive role in the process of extirpating Defilements is accorded to the comprehension of Suffering¹⁹², i.e. the comprehension of the *skandhas* as impermanent (*anītya*) and disagreeable (*duḥkha*)¹⁹³, and especially as empty (*śūnya*) and essenceless (*anātman*)¹⁹⁴. Occasionally, Emptiness is defined as non-existence, in the five *skandhas*, of a substantial Living Being or Person, i.e. in the sense of *pudgalanairātmya*, whereas Essencelessness means non-existence of the *skandhas* themselves, i.e. *dharmanairātmya*¹⁹⁵.

Yet in other passages Harivarman emphasizes that insight into the negative nature of all mundane factors (in the sense of the canonical doctrine of ch. I) is not yet Liberating Insight proper¹⁹⁶. Strictly speaking, the Defilements are eliminated only by insight into the Truth of C e s s a t i o n (*nirodhasatya*)¹⁹⁷ which alone is Ultimate Truth (*paramārtha-satya*)¹⁹⁸. In this insight, which is closely related to, and obviously immediately provoked by¹⁹⁹, the insight into the Essencelessness of the *skandhas*, there is no longer any perception or notion of mundane factors, but mind has for its object Cessation only, which is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*)²⁰⁰, because all *dharma*s, on account of their intrinsic Essencelessness, have ceased *ab aeterno*.

Harivarman's view that the decisive phase of Liberating Insight is insight into the Truth of Cessation (i. e. Nirvāṇa)²⁰¹ is in keeping with the principle that seems to underly the "*saṃjñāvedayitanirodha*-Liberation theory" (ch. H), viz. that detachment from all the mundane spheres can only be achieved by an experience of, or insight into, the supramundane sphere, i.e. Nirvāṇa. In fact, this principle is expressly stated by Harivarman when he says that the notion of disagreeableness with regard to all conditioned *dharma*s becomes definite only after insight into the

189 TSi 362 c 5 ff., esp. c 27 ff. and 363 a 16 f. and 19 ff.

190 TSi 363 a 19–23.

191 Cp. TSi 363 a 7 f.

192 Cp., e.g., TSi 372 a 28 – b 1.

193 TSi 372 b 2; 362 b 2.

194 Ibid.

195 TSi 365 b 15 f.

196 Cp. TSi 362 b 2 f.; 332 c 20 ff.

197 Cp. TSi 323 c 12 f.; 324 c 3; cp. also 372 b 3; 363 a 28; b 13. Cp. also Sh. KATSURA, Harivarman on Satyadvaya, in: IBK 54/1979, p. 960.

198 Cp. TSi 365 b 25 ff.

199 Cp. TSi 372 b 2 f.; cp. also 370 b 28.

200 Cp. TSi 332 c 11 f.

201 Cp. also TSi 362 b 1; c 1 f.; 346 a 10 f.

Truth of Cessation, i.e. Nirvāṇa²⁰²; in the same way as, e.g., a person who has not yet attained to the bliss of the First Dhyāna cannot become detached from sensual pleasures (i. e. from *kāmadhātu*)²⁰³. Harivarman even accepts that *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* implies complete extinction of Cankers or Defilements²⁰⁴, although only in the context of the eight Liberations (*vimokṣa*), not in the context of the nine Successive States (*anupūrvavīhāra*), where it only means (temporary) suppression of mind and mental states²⁰⁵. He explains *saṃjñāvedayita* as "mental states (*vedayita* = *citta*)²⁰⁶ having conditioned [factors] for their object (*saṃskṛtālabana*)"²⁰⁷. These, of course, are eliminated in Liberating Insight which, as stated before, has for its sole object or content Cessation which is unconditioned²⁰⁸. Yet according to Harivarman, Liberating Insight does not require a state of mystical ecstasy, not even entrance into one of the four *dhyānas*, but can be achieved also on the ordinary mental level of *kāmadhātu*)²⁰⁹. In this sense, Harivarman is even more "intellectualist" than the Sarvāstivādins who had admitted, as the lowest mental level in which Liberating Insight can take place, a state inserted in between the ordinary state of mind and the First Dhyāna²¹⁰. Therefore, Harivarman's position seems to be most closely related to the canonical texts discussed in ch. J. 5, and at the same time to the Pali version of Mahāmāluṅkyasutta (ch. J. 4) if the comprehension or contemplation of the negative nature of mundane factors it contains is interpreted as referring to the phase preparatory to Liberating Insight as was also done in the later Pali School (cp. ch. N. 2). On the whole, the similarity of Harivarman's view on Liberating Insight with that of the Pali school is obvious; one of the most important differences is his more intellectualist conception of the Truth of Cessation and Insight into it; another is the fact that he interpretes *anātman* in the sense of *dharmanairātmya* and thereby obtains an organic link between contemplation of the negative nature of mundane existence and insight into the Truth of Cessation.

4.

In Mahāyāna Buddhism such a distinction between the comprehension of Essencelessness (as the true nature of mundane factors) and the comprehension of the truth of Cessation (as the Cessation of all mundane existence ontologically anticipated from time immemorial), a distinction which is at many

202 TSi 363 b 13–15 and 18 f.

203 TSi 363 b 16 f.

204 Cp. TSi 339 b 13.

205 Cp. TSi 344 c 29 ff.; 339 b 28 f.; 340 a 3.

206 TSi 345 a 16 f.

207 TSi 345 a 17 f.; but seemingly otherwise 339 c 8 f.

208 Cp. TSi 339 c 12.

209 TSi 339 a 2 ff.; cp. *Mus.* p. 203.

210 See ch. N. 1. – *anāgamyā* is expressly rejected by Harivarman (TSi 339 a 5 ff.; cp. *Mus.* p. 203 f.).

points palpable enough in Harivarman's text²¹¹, is usually not made. This means that, from the point of view of content, the "positive" and the "negative" tradition came to be fused (the accent, it is true, varying from system to system). With regard to its formal aspect, however, the Mahāyāna descriptions or theories of Liberating Insight, as far as I can see, refer to a clearly mystical experience, which resembles *saṃjñāvedayitanirodha* or *nirodhasamāpatti* in its aspect of a mystico-existential anticipatory realization of Nirvāṇa, though it is usually²¹² clearly distinguished from it, probably because *nirodhasamāpatti* had come to be regarded as a completely non-conscious (or at least subconscious) state, whilst mystical experience is, of course, consciousness, though, in Mahāyāna, a transconceptual one.

*Abbreviations:

(Abbreviations of titles of Pali texts not listed below correspond to those of the CPD!)

- AK(Bh) = Abhidharmakōśa (bhāṣya) of Vasubandhu, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967.
 AKP = L'Abhidharmakōśa de Vasubandhu, trad. et ann. par L. de la Vallée Poussin, Paris-Louvain 1923–1931.
 AKVy = Abhidharmakośavyākhyā of Yaśomitra, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo ² 1971.
 AN = Aṅguttaranikāya (PTS ed.).
 AS = Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga, ed. P. Pradhan, Santiniketan 1950.
 ASBh = Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, ed. N. Tatia, Patna 1976.
 BAREAU, *Recherches* = A. Bareau, Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Sūtra-piṭaka et les Vinayapīṭaka anciens: de la quête de l'Éveil à la conversion de Śāriputra et de Maudgalyāyana. Paris 1963.
 BHSD = F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven 1953.
 CPD = V. Trenckner et al., A Critical Pali Dictionary, Copenhagen 1924–.
 DhCPS = Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra (see ch. B).
 DN = Dīghanikāya (PTS ed.).
 EĀ_C = Ekottarāgama (T 125).
 EB = G. P. Malalasekera et al., Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Colombo 1961–.
 ERGARDT, *Faith* = Jan T. Ergardt, Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism, Leiden 1977.
 FRAUWALLNER, *A.St.* = E. Frauwallner, Abhidharma-Studien, in: WZKS(O) 7/1963 (= I); 8/1964 (= II); 15/1971, 69–102 (= III); 15/1971, 103–121 and 16/1972 (= IV); 17/1973 (= V).
 FRAUWALLNER, *G.i.Ph.* = E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I, Salzburg 1953.
 FRAUWALLNER, *Ph.B.* = E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin ³ 1969.
 HACKER, *Kl. Schr.* = Paul Hacker, Kleine Schriften, ed. by L. Schmithausen, Wiesbaden 1978.
 Hōb = Hōbōgirin, dictionnaire encyclopédique du Bouddhisme, Tokyo 1929–.
 IBK = Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).
 MĀ_C = Madhyamāgama (T 26).
 MN = Majjhimanikāya (PTS ed.).
 MPPUL = É. Lamotte, Le Traité de la grande vertu de sagesse, tome I–IV, Louvain 1944–1976.

211 Cp., e.g., TSi 362 b 2. But cp. also passages like TSi 370 b 28 f. and c 10 ff., or 365 c 1 f., where the distinction seems doubtful.

212 An exception seems to be Kāśyapaparivarta (ed. Staël-Holstein) § 144; cp. *Mus.* p. 222.

MSV = Mūlasarvāstivāda-Vinayavastu, Vol. II, ed. S. Bagchi, Darbhanga 1970.

NYANATILOKA, *B. Wb.* = Nyanatiloka, Buddhistisches Wörterbuch, Konstanz o.J.

PManj = Paramatthamañjūsā, in: Visuddhimaggo with Paramatthamañjūsāṭikā of Bhaddantācariya Dhammapāla, ed. by Rewatadhamma, 3 vols., Varanasi 1969–1972.

PTC = F. L. Woodward, E. M. Hare, et al., Pāli Tripitakam Concordance, London 1952–.

SĀ_c = Saṃyuktāgama (T 99).

SN = Saṃyuttanikāya (PTS ed.).

ŚrBh = Śrāvakabhūmi, ed. K. Shukla, Patna 1973.

Ster.Det.Descr. see ch. C!

SWTF = Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, hrsg. unter der Leitung von H. Bechert, Göttingen 1973–.

T = Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka in Chinese.

TSi = *Tattva- (or Satya-)siddhi of Harivarman (T 1646).

Vi = (Mahā-)Vibhāṣā(-śāstra) (T 1545).

ViSM = Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosācariya, ed. by H. C. Warren, rev. by Dh. Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass., 1950.

VON HINÜBER, *Kasussyntax* = O. von Hinüber, Studien zur Kasussyntax des Pali, besonders des Vinaya-piṭaka. München 1968.

Y_c = Chinese version of the Yogācārabhūmi (T 1579).

Y_m = Sanskrit manuscript of the Yogācārabhūmi kept in the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.

(In the case of AN, DN, MN, Paṭi, and SN, references are to PTS-ed., though, for practical reasons, the texts quoted are from Nālandā-ed.)

A d d e n d a :

ad ch. A. 1: One could, of course, contrast 'Liberating Insight' (*āññā*) with '(Supreme) Perfect Enlightenment' (*(anuttarā) samyaksambodhiḥ*) (cp. T. TAGAMI, *Āññācitta* no imi to seikaku, in: Komazawa-Daigaku Bukkyōgaku-bu Ronshū 2/1971, pp. 75 ff., esp. 82 ff.); but apart from the question of its antiquity this opposition may seem to imply an emphasis on qualitative difference, whereas for some of the materials discussed in this paper exactly the opposite is true (cp., esp., ch. C).

ad n. 8: I should have added SH. MIYAMOTO, The Buddha's First Sermon and the Original Pattern of the Middle Way, in: IBK 26/1965, pp. 855–845, esp. 852, and particularly A. HIRAKAWA, Shitaisetsu no shujusō to hokkan, in: Bukkyō Kenkyū 5/1976, pp. 1 ff. Both scholars favour the authenticity of (at least the content of) the account of Enlightenment given in the DhCPS.

ad n. 11: An opinion on the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version of the DhCPS similar to that of KUSAMA is given by A. HIRAKAWA, op. cit. (add. ad n. 8), p. 6 f.

ad n. 19: Of course, *kāmāsava* could also be understood as a Karmadhāraya if *kāma* is taken in the subjective sense (cp. also K. R. NORMAN, Elders' Verses I 134: "kāma etc. were . . . the means by which *karman* flowed in"), but I do not see how such an interpretation would be possible in the case of *bhavāsrava*.

ad n. 23: Cp. also AN II 198 where the *āsravas*, said to originate in *avidyā* (and other factors), do not themselves include *avidyā*, but are glossed by the expression

vighātāparilāhā (cp. also MN I 9 ff.; 361 ff.; AN III 387 ff.; MVu III 338) which seems to mean “afflictions” in some passages, but evil emotions like annoyance/frustration and anguish/distress (or burning desire? cp. *abhijjhā-domanassa*!) in others, thus appearing to stand, somehow, half-way between Defilements and Suffering, or to comprise aspects of both. I am not certain whether this concept of *āsravas* may contribute to the interpretation of the *Ster.Det.Descr.*, but it should perhaps be considered in connection with its conjectural prefiguration (see n. 27).

ad n. 26: Cp. also DhP 190–192 = Udānavarga XXVII.33–35.

ad n. 50: Cp. also L. HURVITZ, The Eight Deliverances, in: Studies in Pali and Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain (Delhi 1979), p. 152. — In *Āyāraṅga* II.15 quoted by C. CAILLAT, Deux études de moyen-indien, JA 1960, p. 43, *kāṇḍa phāsīe pālīe tīrie* . . . refers to the monastic vows (*mahāvaya*); but surely CAILLAT’s explanation of *kāṇḍa* as an *upalakṣaṇa* for *kāya-vān-manobhih* (op. cit., p. 62, n. 12) is commentatorial and can hardly be accepted as the original meaning.

ad ch. H: The original meaning of *nirodhasamāpatti* (a term which, however, does not occur in the Pāli canon where we only find expressions like *saññāvedayitanirodham upasampajja viharati* or *samāpajjati*) has been discussed in a most stimulating article by H. NAGASAKI, Metsujinjō ni tsuite, in: Ōtani Gakuō 39.2/1959, pp. 64 ff. According to NAGASAKI, *nirodhasamāpatti* originally was nothing but a (metaphorical) designation for Nirvāṇa in terms of meditative concentration (pp. 65 f.; 70 f.; 73 ff.), for in the context of the *anupūrvavihāras* Nirvāṇa is attained, NAGASAKI says (p. 70 f.), subsequent to the 8 meditative concentrations (*samāpatti*), and moreover it is, like meditative concentration, a state of tranquillity (p. 65 f.). Later on, the metaphoricality of the usage was forgotten and *nirodhasamāpatti* came to be understood as being realiter a certain type of meditative concentration, first considered to be accessible to released persons only, but later devaluated to a stage below Nirvāṇa and preceding it (pp. 72 f.; 75 f.). In my opinion, NAGASAKI is right in emphasizing the original identity of *saññāvedayitanirodha* and Nirvāṇa. But I think that the wording of the *vimokṣa* and *anupūrvavihāra* patterns, which after all describe attainment to *saññāvedayitanirodha* with exactly the same expressions as attainment to the preceding stages, should be taken seriously, its purport being that what is attained is a temporary meditative or mystical ascent to the level of Nirvāṇa (in the sense of final Nirvāṇa definitively attained by the Arhat after death, as a state where all ideations and feelings will have ceased), and that this mystical anticipation of final Nirvāṇa effectuates Nirvāṇa in the spiritual sense, i.e. the vanishing of the *āsravas*. As against this, to NAGASAKI, the attainment of *saññāvedayitanirodha* is to be identified with Nirvāṇa in the sense of the vanishing of the *āsravas* (p. 71), an assumption which forces him to interpret the term ‘*saññāvedayitanirodha*’ to mean “cessation of the ideations and feelings of a worldly person (*prthagjana*) and their commutation into the ideations and feelings of an *ārya*” (p. 72). Such an interpretation, though in fact also advocated by Harivarman in the context of the 8 *vimokṣas* (TSi 337 a 27 f.; b 11 f.; c 8 ff.; cp. ch. N.3), does not seem to be supported by any textual evidence in the canon. Moreover, it would imply an analogous artificial interpre-

tation of the *ārūpyas*; for only if the *ārūpyas* were regarded as a gradual emptying and diminution of worldly *saṃjñā* alone would it be understandable that they lead to elimination of worldly *saṃjñā* alone (which I grant may imply elimination of the *āsravas*). But in the canonical *vimokṣa* and *anupūrvavihāra* formulas, no such restriction to worldly *saṃjñā* is expressed or even hinted at.

ad n. 70: Different interpretations of the term *dharmacakkhu* and the sentence “*yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ . . .*” are given by K. MIZUNO, *Abhisamaya* (genkan) ni tsuite (Tōkai Bukkyō 7/1961), p. 54; idem, *Genshi-bukkyō ni okeru satori* (Nihon Bukkyō Gakkai Nempō 31/1966), pp. 8 f.; A. HIRAKAWA, op. cit. (add. ad n. 8), pp. 21 f.; idem, *Genshi-bukkyō ni okeru hō no imi* (Waseda-daigaku Daigakuin Bungaku-kenkyū-ka Kiyō 14/1968), p. 23. For my own view of the sentence “*yaṃ kiñci . . .*”, I should like to point out to SN 23.13–46, but I admit that the passage may need reconsideration.

ad n. 121 (p. 233): As for the problems of constructions like *taṃ santam idaṃ atthī ti pajānāti*, cp. VON HINÜBER, *Kasussyntax*, § 89. The passage may need reconsideration. — The word-order (*idaṃ atthī*, not *atthī idaṃ* as in Ps IV 152, 9) seems to imply emphasis on *idaṃ* (cp. ICKLER, op. cit. [n. 59], p. 92).

n. 147a: This seems to imply that what had been the decisive feature of the state of *saññāvedayitanirodha* for the old positive-mystical current, viz. its being an anticipatory mystical ascent to the sphere of Nirvāṇa, has been given up or has at least lost its functionality in the present Sutta in its received form — a fact which may perhaps also account for the choice of a different term (viz. *animitto cetosa-mādhī*).

ad n. 182: ENOMOTO, *Āsrava* (ro) no seiritsu . . . [see n. 22], p. 42, has shown that the notion of “abandoning” is closely associated to the word *pariññā* already in texts like Dhṣ and Sn, and that the term *pahānapariññā* has a Jainist equivalent in the form of *pratyākhyānaparijñā*.